

PB 34-92-2
APRIL-JUNE 1992

Military Intelligence

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Military Intelligence

PB 34-92-2 APRIL-JUNE 1992

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VANTAGE POINT

Major General Paul E. Menoher, Jr.

We are on the verge of a revolution in Military Intelligence: A revolution in capabilities incorporated in the new family of systems we will field between now and 1997; and a revolution in how we do business to best use these new capabilities to support commanders at all echelons on the fast tempo, extended battlefields of the future.

This revolution did not happen by accident. It was planned and articulated in the Army Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, Target Acquisition Master Plan (AIMP) and has been supported in the last two Program Objective Memorandums (POMs). Similar support in the present POM build will bring most of the AIMP system architecture to fruition. Finally, we have verified and refined the azimuth articulated in the AIMP.

Our MI Relook effort helped us assess the AIMP against the lessons learned in JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM and force reductions imposed on the Army between now and 1995. The AIMP withstood this scrutiny and remains valid, with Relook refinements. We are incorporating Relook refinements into the next iteration of the AIMP and into our implementation of the doctrinal, organizational, training, materiel, and leader development (DOTML) changes required to achieve our MI revolution.

We are already well down the road in designing and implementing these DOTML changes. In the doctrinal area, we have just released for worldwide staffing our final draft of a new MI operational concept embodying our new capabilities. This concept will serve as the underpinning of our input to the revision of **FM 100-5, Operations**, and our own revision of **FM 34-1, IEW Operations**. In the force structure area, we have established new organizational constructs at all echelons corps and below, and we are working with INSCOM to design an EAC MI force projection brigade. We have designed all new organizations to accommodate our new systems and support our operational concept; these, too, are out for worldwide staffing.

In the training arena, we have already revised and are in our third iteration of teaching a new MIOAC, which emphasizes key tenets of our new operational concept, as well as the critical skills

necessary to implement it properly. In the materiel arena, we are looking at ways to evaluate and identify new technologies which will leverage our capabilities beyond those inherent in our new family of systems. To do this, we have created an IEW Technology Assessment Center in coordination with the Program Executive Officer (PEO) IEW, Communications-Electronics Command, and Laboratory Command. To permit us to integrate new leveraging technologies affordably, the PEO IEW is pursuing an open system architecture approach in the development of these systems.

Finally, in the proponentcy and leader development areas, we are consolidating some MOSs, restructuring others, and creating new ones that will give us the skills required to use these new capabilities to the fullest. We are reinforcing this in all of our leader development courses. In addition, we are trying to identify the resources needed to reinstitute a post-MIOAC course of instruction for field grade MI officers to bring them up to speed with the dynamic changes affecting our branch.

A critical ingredient in the success of our revolution will be the creation of a seamless system of intelligence systems from the FLOT through EAC. To facilitate this, INSCOM has established a permanent, 13-person detachment at the Intelligence Center. Headed by Colonel Dave Vore, the detachment will ensure INSCOM/EAC requirements are incorporated into our DOTML changes. The detachment will facilitate the development of coherent DOTML strategies that will lead to our required seamless system of systems.

All of this begs the question of exactly what are the elements of our MI revolution. From a system perspective, they include 12 new systems which we will field between now and 1997:

- ☐ The Imagery Processing and Dissemination System and Tactical Radar Correlator (IPDS/TRAC) (first systems already fielded to V Corps).
- ☐ Guardrail/Common Sensor (GRCS) (first system already fielded to V Corps).
- ☐ The Commanders Tactical Terminal (CTT).
- ☐ UAV-Short Range.

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Command Sergeant Major James A. (Art) Johnson

Many changes are taking place in our Corps which will affect the way we train and fight in the future. The downsizing and the new systems being fielded make it imperative that we consolidate MOSs. This consolidation will give our Corps the flexibility it needs to continue to provide the commander the best intelligence possible. It could also mean a soldier would be trained in more than one specialty.

We need to be smart about consolidation and make sure the mission dictates the action. As you know, we have rolled 33P, 33M, and 33Q into 33Y. MOSs 33V and 33R are in the consolidation process right now. Others being considered for consolidation are MOSs 98H with 98D and 98K, and 97B with 97E. As we move forward, we need your input, so we can make the right decisions.

It is in your interest to keep abreast of the changes in reenlistment policy and procedures. Soldiers who do not act in time may not be able to reenlist. Also, be aware of the Chain Teaching Brief which covers early release plus options available to our soldiers. Over the next few years these two areas are going to be of major concern to all of you. The chain of command and the NCO support chain must be familiar with both areas. You will be required to brief and counsel the soldiers you lead and train on the options available to them. Certainly, they will look to you for advice and assistance.

As part of the force realignment, soldiers holding MOS 33Y, skill level 1, have been placed in the fast track program. According to PERSCOM, MOS 33Y privates through promotable specialists have been identified for possible reclassification to MOS 29Y, 97B, 96B, 35G, or 33R. It is important that soldiers holding 33Y who fall into this category act quickly by requesting reclassification or reenlistment under fast track.

Another major change soldiers need to know about concerns NCOs arriving at professional military schools overweight. Under the new rules, these soldiers face severe consequences, even to the point of release from the Army. It is imperative that all NCOs understand and comply with the rules, since overweight soldiers may not attend professional military schools. All soldiers scheduled to attend such schools must be screened before

they leave their units. Only those meeting the height weight/body fat content standards may leave for school.

Overweight NCOs who arrive for ANCOC, a DA Board selected school, will be dropped from the course. When found to be overweight, the NCO will be—

- ☐ Notified in writing he has not met the height weight/body fat content standards.
- ☐ Dropped from the course.
- ☐ Removed from the DA selection list.
- ☐ Given up to 5 working days to rebut the proposed action.

If the NCO does rebut the proposed action, the Notification Memorandum, Body Fat Content Work Sheet, and the soldier's Items of Rebuttal are submitted to the General Court Martial Convening Authority for a decision. The NCO continues in training until the Court Martial Authority makes its decision, which, by the way, is not appealable. Do not treat this lightly. As you can see, this change can be devastating to a soldier's career. All professional military schools will follow the rules to the letter.

For BNCOC, the action is different from ANCOC. Overweight soldiers arriving for BNCOC are simply denied enrollment without further process.

When an NCO is dropped from ANCOC or denied enrollment to BNCOC, the following rules apply:

- ☐ TDY and return soldiers immediately return to their home units.
- ☐ Active duty TDY en route soldiers are attached to the installation pending classification of follow-on assignment instructions.
- ☐ National Guard soldiers return to their home base and USAR soldiers travel to the gaining unit.

Finally, depending on the soldier's component and travel status, the Court Martial Authority sends a memorandum to his first general officer stating the soldier failed to maintain standards. The memorandum also addresses the unit's failure to identify and enroll the soldier in a weight control program. At the same time, the Court Martial

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FROM THE EDITOR

GREETINGS!

This issue features articles on echelons above corps (EAC) intelligence. Many members of the MI community are not very familiar with U.S. Army EAC units and organizations, and I hope, through this feature, to be able to broaden many readers' understanding of the EAC intelligence mission.

Our EAC organizations provide critical support, not just to national level decision makers, but to tactical commanders as well. Military intelligence professionals at the tactical level need to know what EAC assets can support them, and what products they can get from these assets. If tactical planners don't know what's available to support them, they won't be able to ask for and get what they need.

As these articles show, EAC organizations provided critical support to tactical commanders during the Gulf War. They provided everything from technical intelligence in support of corps commanders to "How They Fight" handbooks for the infantrymen on the ground. If you participated in the Gulf War, you very likely benefited in some way, directly or indirectly, from the outstanding work our EAC intelligence professionals did.

In his article, Major General Charles F. Scanlon, the commander of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, presents to us how he and the U.S. Army will ensure that INSCOM can and will provide this key support in any future conflicts. Other authors cover the contributions of specific organizations and agencies within INSCOM. All in all, you will find a good overview of the Army EAC intelligence mission.

In our next issue (my last as editor), I'd like to feature articles on the "New World Order." I'm looking for articles on the changes taking place in Europe, Central America, and the Middle East, as well as on developments in countries like North Korea and the Philippines. What types of threats will our military be facing in the year 2000 and beyond?

In closing, I'd like to thank First Lieutenant Edward Riehle for getting this issue out. He served as acting editor in chief from January through March, while I was at CAS³. He deserves the credit for putting this issue together, along with the rest of my staff. He recently started MIOAC, so he is no longer with our organization.



Jordan A. Gurnuch

LETTERS

Dear Editor:

I want to comment on Lieutenant Colonel Hall's article in January-March MIPB, "Intelligence Analysis in the 21st Century." What Lieutenant Colonel Hall suggests is not feasible under the current selection criteria and "manufacturing process" we use to produce MI analysts. At present, we do not require nor teach analysts basic logic skills. Instead, we somehow use the range of a person's general technical score, college diploma, and career desires as parameters to gauge analytical potential. Presently, the MI analyst can do what they were trained to do with guidance provided by more experienced intelligence personnel. We teach our MI analysts threat situation map and overlay techniques, combat information recording, and other related intelligence subjects.

I am curious about the measuring devices Lieutenant Colonel Hall would use to determine when the process of mature analytical or even serious thinking occurs. Should he realistically expect the wisdom of Solomon from young MI enlisted or officer personnel? Lieutenant Colonel Hall, I think, is familiar with the intelligence ADP systems we use and are developing. These ADP systems are designed to receive, store, transmit, and retrieve a vast amount of information received daily from a variety of battlefield collection systems. Most of the data collected during conflicts must be rapidly collected and disseminated to subordinate units.

Rapidity is the prime factor (at the tactical and operational levels) over a detailed and thorough analysis, because of information perishability and usability factors.

I do agree with the article's intelligence thought process. However, in my opinion, the average intelligence analyst when faced with a multitude of quick reaction tasks that everybody needed done days ago, will use a combination of formal and OJT experience, sound judgment,

and common sense as his most realistic course of action.

M.S. Evancevich
Fort Huachuca, AZ

Dear Editor:

U.S. Army CI has played a distinctive and successful role in maintaining the status quo of East-West political maneuvering. This was especially true during the Cold War and until the "Wall" fell with the resultant domino effect leading to the cataclysmic collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union.

A direct result of the collapse of communism is the false hope of eternal peace now being espoused by well meaning, albeit maladroit, members of the politically elite. They are saying there's no longer a threat to the U.S. from our former Cold War enemies. They are saying we can now slash our "lean, mean fighting machine" to the bare bone. They are demanding military forces be restructured to meet the challenges of the future. And the real reason behind this mad rush to demilitarization is the notion that we will save money (\$50 billion over the next 5 years).

Nobody is allowed to argue against budget cutting measures—this borders on sacrilege, management concepts, etc. I can best explain this curiosity by recounting this tale: There was a miserly farmer who thought he could save money by gradually feeding his milk cows less each day. After several weeks the farmer's neighbor inquired about the success of his plan. The farmer said, "the plan was working marvelously and I would have succeeded except, just when I got the cow used to eating nothing, it up and died on me." What does this have to do with CI, you may ask?

I direct you to our CI mission in its strategic or EAC role in the grand scheme of things. Our CI mission is to detect, identify, assess, and counter or neutralize the intelligence

collection efforts, other intelligence activities, sabotage, terrorist activities, and assassination efforts of foreign powers, organizations, or persons directed against U.S. Army personnel, information, materiel, and activities.

With the above in mind, let's take a look at the formidable size of the foreign powers (notice it does not say hostile foreign powers). I won't quote statistics, suffice it to say that even with the collapse of the largest intelligence service in history, the East German Intelligence Service, and the redirection and downsizing of the former Eastern Bloc intelligence services, U.S. intelligence is still outnumbered.


Our nation's future security depends on how effective our downsized forces will be in low-intensity conflict situations. Our forces' effectiveness depends directly on how much we know about our enemy—his capabilities and intentions. There is no magic wand or high-tech piece of gadgetry in our bag of tricks that can tell the future. Therefore, we must be continually vigilant to foreign intelligence personalities, capabilities, and trends through CI techniques, investigations, and operations.

To keep the commander informed on a global scale, we must increase our intelligence capabilities, while combat forces decrease in size. Budget be damned! We are either properly prepared to fight or we lose the next war. We will not be prepared adequately unless we go all out to defeat the future enemy at the intelligence game now and continue to beat him at it in the future.

Also, I want to point out that our combat arms must prepare continually for future battle. You can see this preparation in their intensive training programs.

Now I invite your attention to MI. We have been, are now, and will continue to be at war with foreign intelligence services. Just because the political

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**"In spite of the
positive changes,
the world remains
a dangerous place."**

UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND

By Major General Charles F. Scanlon

Our Nation is the only superpower left on the world stage. America's military has won decisive engagements including the lightning defeat of the fourth largest standing army in the world. And we can claim with pride total victory in the Cold War, in which America inexorably relegated an oppressive regime to the dustbin of history.

The defeat of communism has changed the world radically. As nations reemerge from behind the tattered Iron Curtain, the political alliances and traditional threats we've known for decades are shifting. Old enemies, subjects of much of our war-fighting doctrine, now petition us for membership in our most venerable defense alliances.

We have learned from history, though, that Hitlers, Stalins, and Husseins are inevitable products

of human existence. And we must always be prepared to deal with them. In spite of the positive changes, the world remains a dangerous place.

A degree of uncertainty shrouds the globe, bringing with it a new set of intelligence challenges. CIA Director Robert M. Gates recently said: *"In truth, the world is even smaller today.... The nationalist, ethnic, border, and resource conflicts of a long ago world have survived the ravages of 80 years of revolution and war to confront us anew. ...it is our responsibility to forewarn, to anticipate events, to try to make sense out of a kaleidoscopic world, to try to help the policymaker understand developments and thus act effectively."*

Clearly, the Army and the intelligence community must take on an increased level of involvement. This will manifest itself in efforts such as leveraging and melding intelligence activities at echelons




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above corps (EAC) with National Intelligence capabilities.

Future of MI

Recent internal events have influenced the Army's present MI posture. These include the QUICKSILVER and VANGUARD special studies (which addressed force structure), DESERT STORM lessons learned, and the MI Relook which examined our ongoing efforts to ensure wise future planning.

Within the larger defense establishment, the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act and the Defense Intelligence Reorganizations Study have had profound impacts. These have woven the role of MI into the fabric of command throughout the services. Further changes may be in the wings as Congress begins deliberations on the Boren Bill, with its far-reaching impact on the overall U.S. intelligence community.

All of these factors will shape the future of MI. The structure of INSCOM has already changed. Proposed downsizing calls for a 25 percent reduction in INSCOM's size. However, our overall mission

of providing multidiscipline intelligence support to operational and tactical commands and satisfying national and departmental taskings has changed very little. In fact, in some areas, missions have increased.

INSCOM is the Army's operational level MACOM for intelligence. We are the service HUMINT agency, the service production agency, the service cryptologic element, as well as the Army manager and operator for foreign CI. We have the worldwide mission of intelligence and electronic warfare support to Headquarters, DA; theater and field army commanders in chief; other major Army commands and designated DOD agencies; and warfighters at corps and below. Our focus is to support military operations and planning at the operational level. Future doctrine demands that corps and below Army intelligence units have a robust organic capability. But they also need support from INSCOM. This doctrinal application of EAC intelligence proved itself during DESERT STORM.

Evolutionary processes are difficult. But the Army, and MI, can use evolution to support the strategic power projection mission. We can refine

doctrine and field new intelligence systems to provide commanders, at all echelons, an unprecedented view of the battlefield.

A System of Systems

The most significant change is to our doctrine. It now dictates that Army intelligence operate as a "system of systems" to support joint task forces, theater components, and Army corps. That continues as the focus of INSCOM's overarching EAC intelligence support. However, we must not neglect INSCOM's support to national intelligence requirements.

Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan explains: The emerging force will be largely CONUS-based with a relatively small forward presence in Europe, Northeast Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. Army force structure will be smaller and organized as a strategic contingency force rather than the more familiar forwardly deployed mode. "For decades," General Sullivan points out, "we have been a 'containment' Army—we are now a crisis response Army." Even with doctrine changes, INSCOM continues to be the alerting trip wire on the road to any crisis.

Our future Army will be a rapidly deployable and extremely lethal force. It will be tailored to meet the enemy in a variety of scenarios, anywhere in the world. This places a new premium on flexibility. Therefore, we in Army Intelligence must prepare to counter and respond to any threat. Threats range from the simple to the most advanced technologies, any place in the world, and across the broad spectrum of war.

The shift in strategy from forward deployment to forward presence will present fewer opportunities for intelligence units to work directly against overseas threats. But collection opportunities will increase through remote signals collection, CONUS-based HUMINT operations, and as an adjunct to training and readiness exercises. We must always be prepared to seize intelligence collection and analysis opportunities.

All intelligence disciplines, at every level of command, must become more synchronized with other battlefield operating systems. New technology allows us to target, to produce accurate intelligence, and to interact dynamically with other battlefield systems. We must make sure we remain on the cutting edge of technology. Only by leveraging emerging technologies can we provide a seamless flow of intelligence from the National Command Authority down to the brigade task force level.

To succeed, we need flexible, long range, reliable, and robust communications. Our friends in

the Army signal community are hard at work developing these systems. They know that standardization and interoperability are keys to future MI success at EAC.

The Technology Initiative

To seize and keep the technology initiative, we need to develop open architecture designs that allow our capabilities to evolve alongside new technology. We must continue to make high-payoff, leap-ahead technological advances. By using Non-Development Item procurement, we can accelerate our technological advantage.

"All intelligence disciplines, at every level of command, must become more synchronized with other battlefield operating systems."

Nevertheless, the evolution taking place in our MI requirements and capabilities must be disciplined. We must balance new technology against our short- and long-term needs and sustain a viable intelligence system. To maintain our technological overmatch on the battlefield, we must keep the technology base focused squarely on our warfighting needs.

We must give the future force the capability to know, see, and sense (with confidence) where the enemy is throughout the depth of the extended battlefield. Therefore, as EAC moves along the continuum of change, greater leverage of national systems will become even more crucial. Corps, EAC, and national technical means will be the primary deep-looking systems for theater and corps.

EAC MI Brigades

MI is a force multiplier. It provides timely, reliable information that enables commanders to shape battlefield forces with maximum effectiveness at minimum risk. The INSCOM theater MI brigades expedite corps and army component access to national intelligence of unique Army interest. INSCOM is the facilitator between the national level producer and the warfighter on the ground, demanding the most current and best intelligence possible. We also provide a quick reaction capability for detailed analysis of high priority issues.

We are tailoring INSCOM EAC MI brigades to either regional or functional missions. Fort Monmouth's 513th MI Brigade is being reformed for rapid global force projection. Commanded by Colonel Bill Robeson, the brigade already has unique equipment and skills not found elsewhere in MI. During DESERT STORM, other INSCOM assets augmented the 513th, molding it into a formidable battlefield MI presence. This brigade has a continuing relationship with the Power Projection Corps, ARCENT, and the associated Joint Intelligence Centers.

Our INSCOM theater EAC MI brigades will have similar relationships with their affiliated corps and Joint Intelligence Centers. They will be regionally tailored to support the theater army. This includes—

- Support to the Pacific region from the 500th MI Brigade, commanded by Colonel Tom Fergusson at Camp Zama, Japan, and the 501st MI Brigade in Seoul, Korea, commanded by Colonel Joe Stroud.
- European support from the 66th MI Brigade, currently located in Munich, Germany, and commanded by Colonel Jim King.
- SOUTHCOM/U.S. Army South support from the 470th MI Brigade, in Corozal, Panama, commanded by Colonel Dave Young.

The strategic and operational intelligence activities these EAC brigades perform assist in monitoring and covering tactical forces during deployment, and focus on the fighting commander's immediate intelligence needs. Corps must always be able to get the information they need from Army EAC (or joint and combined headquarters) through synergistic, melded intelligence capabilities.

Corps MI Support Element

We are evaluating a new methodology involving the Corps MI Support Element (CMISE) that would blend our intelligence assets. As envisioned, the CMISE is a small staff of military and civilian INSCOM experts who help the corps get needed EAC and national intelligence support. We need to expand corps capability for an integrated intelligence effort and depth of expertise in collection, production, and dissemination. This would allow us to leverage a host of intelligence capabilities, including INSCOM and departmental and national agencies. During crises, the CMISE would monitor the corps area of interest while the corps deploys. As we strive to refine and enhance the Army EAC structure, the concept of CMISE is one of several under consideration.

"The MI community faces challenging times, but we must make sure tomorrow's Army will have the best MI systems we can devise."

Training and Doctrine Integration Detachment

To deal with the complexities of EAC issues, INSCOM has established a training and doctrine integration detachment at the Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca. These EAC subject matter experts, led by Colonel Dave Vore, make up the Intelligence Training and Doctrine (ITRAD) Support Detachment. They work side-by-side with school personnel in the professional development of MI officers. The ITRAD makes sure critical EAC organizational, training, and equipment requirements are folded into the School's manuals, POIs, and concepts. The ITRAD is our commitment to the concept that school and field are partners in the continuing development of EAC intelligence doctrine.

The MI community faces challenging times, but we must make sure tomorrow's Army will have the best MI systems we can devise. INSCOM personnel worldwide are totally committed to this task.

Speaking at the CIA, President George Bush said, "...intelligence remains our basic national instrument for anticipating danger—military, political, and economic. Intelligence is and always will be our first line of defense...." These are inspiring words from a Commander in Chief who has a track record as a key member of the intelligence community. Those of us in this line of work echo the President's words: In the best of times or the worst of times, intelligence does, indeed, remain as America's first line of defense.

Major General Charles Francis Scanlon assumed command of INSCOM in 1990. He was commissioned a second lieutenant from the University of Florida. He holds a master's degree from the University of Hawaii and has completed graduate work at Penn State and Harvard. His military education includes the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, the Naval War College, and the Joint Warfighters Course for Flag Officers. He was assigned to INSCOM in 1980 as the DCSOPS. He subsequently served as Executive to the ACSI, HQ, U.S. Army. Upon his promotion to brigadier general, he became INSCOM Deputy Commander for Support. In 1985, he was selected as the Deputy Commanding General for INSCOM.



INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION and the ARMY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

By James A. Matz

The Army decided to consolidate and centrally manage its general military intelligence (GMI) and scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI) production resources in 1985. The Department of the Army established the Army Intelligence Agency (AIA) as its agency for finished intelligence production. AIA is the link between DA, DOD, and national level agencies for intelligence analysis and production. In 1991, DOD transferred AIA to INSCOM to consolidate and integrate intelligence activities under one command. However, it remains under the operational control of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT).

Mission

AIA's mission is to address the Army's requirement for finished intelligence. These requirements, generated at unit levels as statements of intelligence interest and intelligence production requirements, define the intelligence which is produced and disseminated throughout the Army. AIA's mission is to—

- ☐ Produce and disseminate finished intelligence oriented on ground components.
- ☐ Provide threat analysis support to Army forces and materiel developers.
- ☐ Support weapons acquisition.
- ☐ Manage the Army foreign materiel program.
- ☐ Produce operational intelligence support for deployed forces.
- ☐ Support the DOD joint intelligence center

structure with ground component intelligence.

As the Army's production and dissemination manager, AIA—

- ☐ Optimizes resources and integrates inter-center production.
- ☐ Coordinates taskings with DIA and Army taskers.
- ☐ Prioritizes program goals and objectives.
- ☐ Resolves GMI and S&TI issues.
- ☐ Validates intelligence requirements and dissemination.

AIA manages automation and data bases to make sure they remain compatible within AIA, and between AIA and other DOD agencies. AIA serves as a resource management point by consolidating program, budget, and manpower submissions. It is responsible for managing funds and resources so they're allocated equitably.

Organization

The AIA commander is also the Assistant DCSINT for foreign intelligence. AIA's analytical capabilities and the DCSINT's policy guidance role are combined through this dual-hatted position.

AIA has a headquarters element and two production centers. The headquarters element provides staff support to subordinate centers and is located in Falls Church, Virginia. Plans are to move the headquarters to Fort Belvoir and to merge some of its administrative functions with INSCOM.

Intelligence production is a multidiscipline effort.

Analysts research, analyze, and review open-source material and collected information, as well as reevaluate previously produced intelligence. It takes time to develop this degree of specialization, in-depth expertise, and institutional memory. Consequently, there are more than two civilian analysts for every military analyst, with 818 civilians and 389 military. Although engineers and scientists do much of AIA's analytical work, it also requires many GMI specialists, both military and civilian.

Although AIA relies heavily on civilian analysts, it offers leadership and analytical positions to MI officers. These officers develop into subject area experts. They have direct exchange with other intelligence organizations at DA and DOD and at national and international levels. And they also gain valuable staff and management experience. The positions begin at captain and go through colonel levels and include two brigade-equivalent command positions.

Foreign Science and Technology Center

The Army's S&TI production is done at the Foreign Science and Technology Center (FSTC). Located in Charlottesville, Virginia, it produces S&TI on—

- ☐ Foreign ground systems.
- ☐ Military related technologies research.
- ☐ Foreign materiel exploitation.
- ☐ Army signatures program.
- ☐ Technical sensors analysis.
- ☐ Operational intelligence support.
- ☐ Support to weapons acquisition.
- ☐ Directed energy weapons.

This center concentrates on all-source intelligence analysis and capabilities evaluation of foreign ground systems and materiel. You may have seen, or even used, FSTC products and technical assessments on Iraqi weapon systems during the Gulf War. DIA's distributed production program publishes many of FSTC's products in response to the needs of Army ground forces as well as other DOD customers.

The FSTC plays a key role in the Army's foreign materiel program for the acquisition and exploitation of foreign systems. This program supports FSTC's scientific and technical intelligence production on the characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of foreign weapon systems. The best way to meet some of these requirements is to acquire, test, and exploit foreign ground weapon systems and to identify current and future threats to U.S. systems.

Products are disseminated by formal reports, studies, and technical trends and projections. De-

velopers use these products to improve the capabilities of current systems, to develop countermeasures against new technical threats, and to design the most effective future weapon systems. The S&TI process, ultimately, gives the U.S. soldier technologically advanced systems to overmatch any threat.

Intelligence Threat Analysis Center

The Intelligence Threat Analysis Center (ITAC) is the Army's GMI production center. ITAC's mission is to produce GMI on—

- ☐ Operational intelligence support.
- ☐ Ground force studies and assessments.
- ☐ Threat projections.
- ☐ Imagery exploitation.
- ☐ Counterterrorism analysis.
- ☐ CI threat analysis.
- ☐ Counter-drug analysis.

ITAC performs all-source GMI analysis and production. It looks at foreign tactics, doctrine, training, and force structure; geographic environments; and future capabilities. The ITAC has extensive capabilities in imagery interpretation and related products. It also supports the Army's force development community and operational forces. During the Gulf War, ITAC disseminated products on Iraqi forces' capabilities and intentions directly to operational forces in the Kuwait theater of operations. ITAC's continual analysis and updating of its data base allows flexibility and rapid response to operational force requirements.

Intelligence Support Categories

Who uses AIA's intelligence products? Customers include commanders and operational forces, force modernization and materiel developers, training and doctrine writers, and national and strategic policy makers.

AIA products include estimates for ground forces, targeting intelligence, basic encyclopedic intelligence, and products tailored to the unique requirements of specific commanders or units.

Support to force modernization and materiel development requires the full integration of GMI and S&TI. This support focuses on the current and forecasted threat which is needed during a system's development and life cycle. Finished intelligence is increasingly more important as a system moves through its design, development, production, and operational phases. This process defines the operational environment and competing characteristics of the systems against which it will operate.

Accurate intelligence avoids costly changes and

modifications to systems during development or those which have been issued to the field. Finished intelligence is critical to decision makers. We use it to make sure our soldiers have advanced systems with the longevity to overmatch current and future threats.

Intelligence contributes to our training and doctrine. It provides assessments of areas and forces we may have to operate in and against. Forecasts include size, organization, equipment, and doctrine of foreign forces. Forecasts often contribute to order of battle holdings.

Once we identify force characteristics, we can establish doctrine and scenarios. This results in training which accurately shows the current and projected threat. National Training Center developers use AIA products to develop scenarios. These products include not only the acquisition and technical assessment of foreign weapons but also organization, tactics, doctrine, and training required for their use.

And finally, AIA produces estimates, assessments, studies, and reports to support national, DOD, and DA decision makers. AIA also participates in both national and international intelligence committees and working groups. Here, an AIA assignment offers MI officers an opportunity to participate in the national intelligence process.

DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

AIA supported Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM through continuous intelligence production for all echelons.

At the strategic level, AIA provided intelligence products as well as direct analytical support to DIA, DA staffs, and the National Joint Intelligence Center. Notable studies and reports are "Gulf War 90," "Iraqi Operational Sustainability," "Iraqi Center of Gravity," "Republican Guards (As An Indicator)," "Dusty Agent Threat," armor and antiarmor studies, and Patriot studies. Briefings, papers, and quick reaction taskings kept the leadership informed of Iraqi capabilities. Many of these products found their way to other echelons or were the basis of more detailed studies.

At the operational level, AIA concentrated on CENTCOM, especially ARCENT, as well as TRADOC, FORSCOM, and Army Materiel Command. We focused on specific Iraqi capabilities and scenarios. Products included offensive scenarios, defense scenarios, Iraqi combat engineer capabilities, principles of Iraqi command and control, chemical warfare capabilities, and the intelligence encyclopedia.

At the tactical level, we looked at intelligence of

direct interest to the small unit and the individual. Typical products were "Identifying the Iraqi Threat and How They Fight" handbooks, periodic assessments, IPB, fly-away briefing teams to deploying units, foreign materiel briefings and displays, briefings on how to defeat SAMs, unit templates, targeting reports, exploitation of the SCUD for Patriot use, and fire trench analysis. We passed these and other products to deployed forces in theater, and we provided AIA products to our warfighters and to other services.

The Future

As a result of the dynamic international events of the past few years, AIA has reexamined its intelligence production focus. The Gulf War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the changing global security environment, and other factors altered our perception of the current, and more importantly, the future threat. The key features of the future threat are—

- ☐ Regional instability.
- ☐ New centers of economic, military, and political power.
- ☐ Continuing integration of world economies—pervasive influence.
- ☐ Growing diffusion of power.
- ☐ Proliferation of warfighting technology.

To meet the challenges, we are refocusing our intelligence interests and priorities. Intelligence demands expand our need for coverage of new geographic locales, functional and technical areas, and tailored products.

Besides external changes, there are internal factors shaping AIA's future, such as—

- ☐ Changes to the Army force structure.
- ☐ Support to the joint intelligence center concept.
- ☐ Expansion of the DIA shared intelligence production program.
- ☐ Defense guidance—restructuring defense intelligence for the 1990's.
- ☐ Resource and funding constraints.

These factors impact on AIA's future and require the best use of limited resources, the highest quality of analysis, continued automation improvement, and communications systems integration. Organizational changes will occur as AIA transitions into the future.

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Battlefield TECHINT:

Support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM

PHOTO: CAPTAIN AL J. BEDGOOD

By Lieutenant Colonel Brian Fredericks and
Captain Richard Wiersema

Immediately after the VII Corps offensive into Iraq began, the corps TOC received reports on abandoned enemy communications vans and T-72 tanks. The reports were passed to the Corps G2. In the Corps G2 section, the technical intelligence (TECHINT) liaison officer compared them with his enemy equipment collection requirements and determined they were lucrative targets for TECHINT operations. The liaison officer asked the G3 section for a helicopter to transport a few of his analysts to the site as quickly as possible. A harried G3 major attempted to dismiss the request with a terse remark: "We're kicking butt. What do we need TECHINT for?" At least the major didn't ask, "What's TECHINT?"

This attitude soon changed, however. By the time DESERT STORM entered the 100-hour ground war phase, TECHINT was integrated into operations at corps and army levels. This article examines the battlefield TECHINT role in the Gulf War. It includes a review of TECHINT doctrine and the evolution of its Southwest Asia mission. It also analyzes the challenges and highlights some of the

key successes. Finally, it presents lessons learned and recommends improvements to the process.

Doctrine

Battlefield TECHINT operations consist of collecting, handling, analyzing, and exploiting captured enemy equipment, related documents, and other materiel. To accomplish these operations, the Army has only one TECHINT battalion: The Foreign Materiel Intelligence Battalion (FMIB) of the 513th MI Brigade. The FMIB consists of the 11th MI Company (the Army's only active duty TECHINT company), a battalion headquarters company, and two detachments.

Before the conflict, the FMIB had coordinated with Unified Commands and Marine, Navy, and Air Force TECHINT components to work out the principles of battlefield TECHINT operations. The FMIB applied these principles in several exercises. **FM 34-54, Battlefield Technical Intelligence**, plus exercise experiences, provided the framework for planning and conducting TECHINT operations in Southwest Asia.

According to doctrine, the 11th MI Company fields teams of TECHINT analysts to support each corps in theater. Headed by an MI lieutenant, these

11-member teams consist of specialists in armament (tracked and wheeled), NBC, communications, medical logistics, and engineer equipment. Each team is task-organized according to the mission and known enemy capabilities. Team members are staff sergeants or sergeants first class who come to the battalion with no intelligence experience but have strong technical backgrounds. The intent is to train a 63H tracked vehicle mechanic with 6 to 10 years of experience on American tanks to assess the capabilities and limitations of a foreign tank.

A TECHINT team deploys with a corps MI brigade. Its mission is to rapidly assess the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and limitations of enemy equipment, particularly weapon systems captured or overrun during combat. The team also trains friendly forces to safely and expediently operate enemy vehicles and weapons. Our experience in joint exercises soon taught us the need for a TECHINT liaison officer on each supported corps staff. He gives the team collection guidance, helping the team chief focus on leading the team rather than on serving as a staff officer.

The battalion also establishes the Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center (JCMEC). This center, which includes other services, supports the theater's joint commander as well as the Army commander and their intelligence staffs. The JCMEC consists of the battalion tactical operations center and an adjacent storage area for captured equipment. The JCMEC—

- ☐ Provides collection management for all TECHINT operations in theater.
- ☐ Monitors captured enemy equipment evacuation through collection points.
- ☐ Receives captured equipment to satisfy collection requirements.

Subject matter experts (either senior NCOs or warrant officers), intelligence analysts, and materiel handlers form the personnel base for the JCMEC. In addition, other services augment the JCMEC, so it can field additional teams to support teams deployed to the corps or in support of the theater J2.

Force Structure

Battlefield TECHINT operations in Southwest Asia began less than a month after President Bush ordered the Army to Saudi Arabia. Then, and throughout the war, the FMIB bore the brunt of both the Army and the theater TECHINT efforts.

When alerted on August 6, 1990, the battalion's strength was just over 200 soldiers. These soldiers were distributed between HHC, the 11th MI Com-

pany, and two Opposing Forces training detachments at Aberdeen Proving Ground, the battalion's home station, and Fort Irwin, California.

Initial Deployment

The XVIII Airborne Corps G2 requested the attachment of a TECHINT team to the 525th MI Brigade before the brigade departed for Saudi Arabia. In response, the FMIB formed TECHINT Team 1 and sent it to Fort Bragg. Team 1 was attached to the 519th MI Battalion and deployed to Dhahran August 23, 1990. For 6 months, until the arrival of the FMIB main body, it was the only theater battlefield TECHINT unit.

Shortly after Team 1 deployed, the FMIB deployed a small liaison cell with the 513th MI Brigade advance party. In the ARCENT Intelligence Center, this cell began to develop plans and requirements for future TECHINT operations. From the outset, however, the lack of a dedicated TECHINT element on the J2 staff hampered TECHINT planning and coordination at the theater level. At CENTCOM, TECHINT planning became an additional responsibility of the J2 operations officer for HUMINT, whose main focus was the handling of potentially thousands of EPWs.

By early November 1990, the Army alerted the VII Corps to move from Europe to Saudi. It now was apparent the FMIB main body would have to deploy. Accordingly, ARCENT ordered the FMIB to establish the JCMEC and gave the FMIB commander the mission to conduct—

- ☐ Battlefield exploitation of captured enemy equipment to determine its capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities.
- ☐ NBC and medical sampling for verification of the first use of chemical or biological weapons to support national level introduction of countermeasures.

The second mission quickly became FMIB's highest priority. Concern over possible Iraqi use of chemical weapons grew, and verification of their first use was paramount in gauging any U.S. retaliation. Furthermore, the extent of Iraq's biological weapons capability was of additional concern.

FM 34-54 describes the basic procedures for chemical sampling missions, but neither the teams nor the JCMEC had the communications or the transportation to carry out the verification mission. However, the FMIB anticipated what they needed to handle and package samples for shipment to the U.S., and containers made by the Intelligence Materiel Activity at Fort Meade arrived shortly after the FMIB main body.

A Technical Escort Unit from Edgewood Arsenal,

Maryland, augmented the JCMEC. This unit handled samples destined for exploitation in the U.S. Unit members had to coordinate extensively to get space on aircraft at corps and theater levels to fly "first-use" samples from the battlefield to CONUS laboratories. While this arrangement was often frustrating, it gave the JCMEC added visibility that later proved helpful in other TECHINT missions.

JCMEC Established

On January 6, 1991, the FMIB main body arrived in Dhahran and soon moved into a warehouse complex to establish the JCMEC. With the balance of the 11th MI Company on hand, the battalion formed TECHINT Teams 2 and 3 to support the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and VII Corps. The veteran Team 1 stayed with the XVIII Airborne Corps. The JCMEC also got invaluable augmentation in the form of a British army officer and a Royal Air Force officer. These individuals managed collection requirements in support of British forces deployed in the Persian Gulf.

U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps TECHINT personnel also became part of the JCMEC, as well as National Scientific and Technical Intelligence (S&TI) Agency representatives. Equipped with experimental biological warfare sampling systems, the 9th Chemical Company was also attached to help with the mission. From its austere skeleton of two companies and two detachments, FMIB had evolved into an organization with teams deployed throughout Saudi Arabia. The following graphics reflect the JCMEC organization as well as the deployment of these assets.

DESERT STORM

When the allied bombing offensive began on January 16, 1991, it prompted Iraqi SCUD attacks. The newly formed JCMEC performed its first war-time missions by retrieving debris from missile strikes. A neighboring Patriot battery contributed to this mission by downing one of the first SCUDs fired on Dhahran and dropping the missile parts on the JCMEC compound. Soon SCUD missile parts were en route back to CONUS for exploitation at the Missile and Space Intelligence Center, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. The Army used the results from this exploitation to improve the Patriot missile's effectiveness against the SCUD threat while hostilities were still going on.




"The JCMEC determined that, while the armor was effective against some light and medium antitank weapons, it proved no match for the TOW II."

While the JCMEC handled the SCUD mission, the deployed teams got ready for the ground war. As the Iraqi army began to crack under the strain of the bombing campaign, Iraqi soldiers from frontline units defected to allied lines. The TECHINT teams provided valuable technical expertise at the corps EPW cages. Often the TECHINT analyst sat beside the interrogator during the questioning, asking for information on weapon and equipment capabilities.

During the Battle of Khafji, TECHINT teams and the JCMEC got a chance to prove themselves to commanders at all echelons. During operations around Al Khafji, Marines captured an Iraqi T-55 tank fitted with bulky add-on armor, something that was relatively unknown to friendly forces. Since Team 2 was operating close to the fighting, they were in a position to react quickly. Their analysts retrieved several blocks of the armor for evacuation back to the JCMEC.


The JCMEC determined that, while the armor was effective against some light and medium anti-tank weapons, it proved no match for the TOW II. The JCMEC, serving as the link between the battlefield and the national intelligence community, sent the samples back to the U.S. for detailed exploita-

JCMEC ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE



DEPLOYMENT OF JCMEC ASSETS

COMPUTER GRAPHICS: GARY BRILES



tion. The JCMEC then disseminated the results across the entire theater. Commanders not yet in contact could now benefit from the combat experience of others. While a relatively minor incident, the add-on armor exploitation is an excellent example of the support battlefield TECHINT can provide.

Even as Team 2 initiated TECHINT support at Al Khafji, the JCMEC was planning to meet the TECHINT requirements of a full-scale offensive into Kuwait and Iraq. Liaison officers deployed with each corps-level headquarters to help the teams and intelligence staffs plan TECHINT operations. By Ground-day, each corps operations order, as well as the ARCENT order, contained a TECHINT appendix to the intelligence annex.

The JCMEC planned chemical and biological sampling missions in detail. As ARCENT planned for a rapid rate of advance, the JCMEC planned for two forward locations. One was at King Khalid Military City where the 22d Support Command was to establish a Theater Captured Equipment Collection Point. The other was in Kuwait City where the Iraqis had their heaviest force concentration and which would be close to captured equipment after the fighting.

Challenges Encountered

When the ground war began, the JCMEC and its deployed teams faced severe handicaps in accomplishing their mission. They anticipated the rapid pace of the advance, but did not anticipate the lack of transportation to move captured equipment into collection points. It became evident that little, if any, equipment would be evacuated from Iraq back to Saudi Arabia.

As the JCMEC grappled with the logistic problems of getting high priority items evacuated, the teams encountered two new major problems. First, units that had the captured equipment often inaccurately reported on the system or its location. Second, the order was given to destroy all Iraqi equipment in U.S. hands. More than once, liaison officers or team chiefs got reports of equipment on the collection plan which, while its location and type were being verified, was destroyed before confirmation was possible.

To correct this deteriorating situation, the JCMEC and TECHINT teams began a series of stop-gap operations. First, as part of Task Force Freedom, the battalion established JCMEC Forward (already planned for Kuwait City before Ground-day). Because of personnel constraints placed on ARCENT units deploying into Kuwait

City, the mission's size and scope were curtailed. Team 2, already in position to exploit equipment in Kuwait, began sending out "Go Teams" to search for and acquire equipment anywhere in Kuwait. Team 3, after a series of helicopter sorties into Iraq, moved into Kuwait City to help Team 2.

Team 1 operated across the longest axis of advance, that of XVIII Airborne Corps. This team capped its 7 months of TECHINT operations in Southwest Asia with a series of equipment retrieval missions near the Euphrates River. The JCMEC also organized an extraction mission into Iraq's Tallil and Jalibe Air Bases. This garnered four C-130 loads of valuable avionics and aircraft weapon systems, in spite of the base's ongoing destruction by U.S. forces. Realizing its value, the Air Force quickly evacuated this materiel out of theater.

The JCMEC encountered yet another unforeseen problem when numerous Army agencies inundated it with requirements for enemy equipment beyond what was needed for intelligence purposes. Instead of being an intelligence operation, the JCMEC was becoming a clearing house for all captured materiel requirements, whether for intelligence, R&D, or training. The lack of a dedicated CENTCOM TECHINT planning and coordinating cell to filter these requirements compounded the problem. As the horde of Iraqi prisoners of war poured out of corps sectors, the J2 staff's immediate and proper concern was how to handle the enormous volume of prisoners. Captured equipment had to wait.

PHOTO: CAPTAIN R. WIERSEMA



"...FMIB soldiers overcame the challenges and acquired six of the Defense Intelligence Agency's 'Top 10' theater requirements for foreign materiel and 207 of an additional 'want list' of 292 items."

Successes

Despite the obstacles, FMIB soldiers overcame the challenges and acquired six of the Defense Intelligence Agency's "Top 10" theater requirements for foreign materiel and 207 of an additional "want list" of 292 items. The battalion also published pamphlets on Iraqi equipment and distributed over 6,000 of them to our soldiers. More importantly, JCMEC soldiers collected, processed, and prepared for shipment back to the U.S. over 200 items. These included tanks and armored personnel carriers valued at over \$250 million. They acquired equipment made in China, South Africa, and the Soviet Union. The JCMEC even retrieved a relatively intact SCUD from the waters off Jubayl. This equipment will undergo additional intelligence exploitation by all of the services. The Army will incorporate some of the equipment into its foreign equipment inventory for JRTC and NTC training.

Lessons Learned

The Joint TECHINT Cell. First and foremost, the theater TECHINT architecture must be reconfigured. In coordination with DIA, FMIB is establishing a joint TECHINT management cell which will augment the theater's J2 upon alert notification. Headed by DIA, the cell will have representatives from each service's S&TI Center. It will provide all taskings to the JCMEC. This association will eliminate the problem of having to manage and validate requirements at the JCMEC and of not having a dedicated TECHINT planning element on the J2 staff. Future exercises will incorporate this concept, the first of which is LANTCOM's OCEAN VENTURE in May.

Equipment Collection Points. The failure of U.S. maneuver units to establish effective collection points during the ground war does not bode well for future battlefield TECHINT operations. The FMIB does not have the resources to evacuate captured equipment. Units must evacuate equipment the same way they evacuate EPWs. Division and corps need to establish collection points to evacuate captured equipment to these centralized locations for screening.

The argument that there wasn't enough time and resources to establish collection points is weak when you compare our performance to that of the British. UK's 1st Armored Division, with two maneuver brigades and a Royal Transport Regiment, established a division collection point of over 400 items while still in Iraq. Its intelligence staff was able to inventory items of intelligence interest, to mark them for evacuation, and to clear the remainder for destruction. In short, the British executed our

doctrine expertly. The larger, more logistically robust U.S. divisions could have done the same.

Equipment Identification. It soon became apparent that intelligence staffs below corps often could not identify enemy equipment. In particular, mobile surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missile systems were wrongly identified, not by combat units reporting their capture, but by intelligence staffs making the identification after on-site inspections. These mistakes waste valuable and limited TECHINT resources, besides confusing analysts trying to determine enemy strength and order of battle. When TECHINT team chiefs or liaison officers found an incorrect identification while investigating a possible item of intelligence interest, it was not uncommon for division or brigade intelligence staffs to tell them, "You guys are the experts. We don't know that stuff."

Total Army Concept. DESERT STORM highlighted some key points regarding the TECHINT force structure. The Reserves hold almost two-thirds of the Army's TECHINT capability. The scope of the TECHINT mission in Southwest Asia required Reserve augmentation, but no TECHINT units were activated. While we can expect the Active force initially to deploy, as they did during DESERT STORM and previously in URGENT FURY and JUST CAUSE, the Army needs Reserve TECHINT units for large-scale sustained operations. Once activated, the Reserve TECHINT units should receive some advanced training before deploying to augment the FMIB. Closer coordination between Active and Reserve TECHINT training programs is critical, and initiatives are ongoing to make this happen.

TECHINT: Not a War Winner. The Gulf War demonstrated that the rapid pace of combat operations and the subsequent rapid redeployment from the Area of Operational Responsibility are probably the model for future operations. If so, battlefield TECHINT risks being a low priority in this model. Unlike other intelligence disciplines, TECHINT will rarely provide the battlefield commander with information of immediate operational value, as in the case of the add-on armor exploitation at Khafji. In a one- or two-battle war, battlefield TECHINT's primary value will be to the commander in the next war, through follow-on exploitation by U.S. intelligence and R&D communities.

Recommendations

The Intelligence community must train its soldiers better on the vital role of TECHINT operations. And it must teach soldiers how to identify equipment. For example, the NTC OPFOR Training Detachment received feedback from Gulf combat

soldiers who didn't know what to do with captured equipment. The Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca should include training on battlefield TECHINT operations in its instruction. Intelligence officers at all levels could then make a conscious effort to integrate captured equipment exploitation into their training exercises. Also, the Intelligence Center needs to give more extensive training in equipment identification. A picture is great, but with the Army's pool of foreign equipment, Fort Huachuca should maintain a comprehensive static display of threat equipment.

Similarly, TECHINT operations should be incorporated into real world contingency planning at the outset. Intelligence staffs at corps and joint levels should anticipate TECHINT requirements in the early planning stages.

In addition, Quartermaster and Transportation Officer Advanced Courses must incorporate training on processing captured equipment. These branches oversee captured equipment evacuation and establish equipment collection points. We recommend the Intelligence Center coordinate with these schools to begin incorporating into the curriculum the doctrine for processing captured equipment.

Summary

Despite DESERT STORM challenges, the JCMEC and deployed TECHINT teams provided

valuable assistance to the supported intelligence staffs and achieved impressive results. JCMEC soldiers scrounged heavy equipment transporters to bring SILKWORM missiles and T-72 tanks out of Kuwait. They organized the helicopter extraction of BMD airborne infantry fighting vehicles from a mine field in Iraq. And they snatched aircraft components and missile systems from Tallil Airfield before the ground had to be returned to Iraq.

The equipment captured in Iraq and Kuwait is expected to save \$250 million in foreign materiel acquisition costs. That's how much DOD would have spent to acquire the same equipment for exploitation, testing, and training. Some of the equipment recovered, such as the T-72, not only will provide research materiel for technological exploitation, but also will be available at the NTC so that every tank gunner who goes through rotation there can see a real threat tank in his gun sight.

Since many potential adversaries have the equipment we acquired in Iraq, we can use the knowledge acquired from its exploitation to better prepare our Army to fight and win the next conflict. In the words of that G3 major in the VII Corps TOC, we need TECHINT to make sure we continue to "kick butt" the next time.

LTC Brian Fredericks is the FMIB commander. Captain Richard Wiersema is the FMIB S3, and served as its HHC commander during Operation DESERT STORM. Captain Wiersema also served as TECHINT Liaison Officer to the G2, U.S. VII Corps.

PHOTO: CAPTAIN R. WIERSEMA

"Some of the equipment recovered, such as the T-72,...will provide research materiel for technological exploitation...."





Imagery Intelligence at Echelons Above Corps

By Colonel Robert H. Clegg

Centralization of national level imagery intelligence runs counter to support of the tactical commander. For two decades, MI has nurtured a program called Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) that facilitates the use of national imagery by tactical units. This program has been successful; however, as Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM clearly demonstrated, it requires expansion and increased support.

MI leadership recognized that to properly support Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, we needed an EAC imagery exploitation element in theater. Such an element must have immediate access to national and theater levels imagery to generate reports, annotate prints, and construct mosaic-like products in a timely manner. Further, we needed the ability to promptly disseminate such products to division and lower.

To meet this requirement, the Joint Imagery Production Complex (JIPC) was created. It was subordinated to the J2, U.S. Central Command. Although Joint and at Unified Command level, the JIPC still qualifies as EAC. With over 200 imagery interpreters, the JIPC was the first significant decentralization of national imagery exploitation and marks a turning point in the EAC and TENCAP intelligence structures.



PHOTOS COURTESY THE AUTHOR



IMINT proved to be the primary intelligence source in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. The terrain, lack of vegetation, and static nature of the Iraqi defense made imagery the ideal intelligence source. U.S. forces in Southwest Asia employed a full suite of imagery sensors on various platforms providing a complementary and synergistic effect. The hardcopy photo, along with imagery analyst readout, was very much in demand. The actual photo was used for—

- ☐ Current intelligence situational assessment.
- ☐ Target development.
- ☐ Battle damage assessment.
- ☐ Combat operations planning.
- ☐ Search and rescue.
- ☐ Terrain analysis and mapping.

And to a lesser extent, the photo was used for order of battle data base development. A variety of soldiers at all echelons performed these functions.

Because the actual print was used so extensively, an EAC in-theater imagery receipt and exploitation capability was unquestionably needed. Further, the copy requirement—often over 50 copies of each print—required an EAC in-theater photo lab capability. Clearly, the value of an image in the hands of a pilot, ground maneuver commander, engineer, targeteer, or intelligence analyst cannot be overstated.

JIPC Organization

The JIPC's job was to receive, analyze, produce, and disseminate timely imagery products to support the Headquarters, CENTCOM, theater components, major subordinate commands of the components, and coalition forces. The JIPC organization had a command element, staff sections, and component command elements. The command element included the director, an Army colonel; a deputy director, an Air Force colonel; and two NCOICs, an E9 Marine and an E9 Airman. The staff sections included an assistant director for operations, one for exploitation, one for requirements, and one for production (photo processing).

The component command elements included

the 581st MI Company, 66th MI Brigade; the 17th MI Company, 513th MI Brigade; 1700th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron; 2d and 3d Force Imagery Interpretation Units (USMC); a Special Operations element; and a CENTCOM/Commonwealth Team.

Each service had imagery exploitation and photo lab capabilities. The concept of operations was predicated on the federated intelligence concept: Service components would contribute EAC exploitation and production elements but still command their own assets. The CENTCOM J2 was the central manager and operations controller. This arrangement alleviated service concerns about getting dedicated support, since each respective component element was able to satisfy its own service-unique requirements.

To take advantage of the joint nature of the JIPC, the director had authority to shuffle component individual interpreters to address critical issues and to make best use of specific skills. Photo lab capabilities varied by service. And since the Air Force had the most sophisticated production operation, they handled the overall photo processing and production effort and ran the Marine and Army photo labs.

This arrangement worked well and was necessary because no one service had the total capability of receiving, exploiting, producing (photo lab), and disseminating imagery. Each service contributed its capabilities which, together, gave the theater an EAC and Joint total capability.

The JIPC Contribution

The JIPC produced first- and second-phase reports in the Initial Photo Interpretation Report format, annotated print products, and long roll imagery products consisting of roll prints, positives, and negatives.

First-phase reports provide a quick response of very basic information, while second-phase reports are more detailed. Imagery reports generally list counts of equipment, identification or type of equipment, activity associated with the equipment, and the location. To facilitate the referencing of reporting, the JIPC designed 9- by 9-mile square boxes for the entire area of operations, and assigned numbers to the boxes. Thus, the JIPC could specify and prioritize each requirement for exploitation. The

JIPC electronically dispatched over 14,000 messages.

Print products were mostly of point targets, but the JIPC did develop some wide-area coverage print arrays. Since they didn't have time to produce true mosaics, they developed a substitute in the form of print arrays that could be taped together. Categories of JIPC print products included:

- ☐ Breach area studies.
- ☐ Division target arrays.
- ☐ Battalion kill arrays.
- ☐ Battle damage assessment point targets.
- ☐ Target development prints.
- ☐ Target materiel work station products.
- ☐ Special items of interest.
- ☐ Point target prints.

The JIPC produced over 57,000 print products.

Two major efforts deserve special mention here: The battalion kill arrays and the breach point products. The JIPC photographically arrayed over 75 armor and artillery battalions. They dispatched this product to pilots and ground maneuver commanders to plan their attacks. The use of the arrays allowed commanders to accurately place ordnance and to reduce time on target. Up to 200 kills per night were recorded. The breach area studies consisted of readout and print arrays which showed obstacles along the entire border area. Knowing the obstacles' locations allowed planners to select breach points. The JIPC worked with the 30th Topographic Battalion to mass-produce these products, so they could be widely disseminated.

The JIPC could not have produced any of these imagery products without a precision imagery processing capability. Although photo lab resources were limited, the JIPC processed over 1.3 million feet of rolled imagery. This rate had never before been reached, not even during the height of the Vietnam War.

The JIPC assumed responsibility for dissemination of not only its own products but also those of the Washington community. We established ground and air couriers out-of-hide, and dispatched over 7,000 packages weighing in the tons. However, dissemination was a continuous challenge and needs to be addressed in any EAC structure.

Imagery EAC Architecture

The Army recognizes that the nature of intelligence flow is both from "the top down" and "the bottom up," so it needs IMINT units at each echelon. The discussion here focuses on EAC. The JIPC experience shows the need for an Army battalion-sized element that is either attached to a

JIPC-like structure or maintains a strict component support function, operating within an MI Brigade. Such an IMINT battalion might have an imagery receive company that would get the imagery from collectors and perform first-phase exploitation. A second company might have a number of imagery interpreters and light tables for second- and even third-phase exploitation.

A third company might perform the production and dissemination functions. This element would need a modern photo processing and production capability and a dissemination operation with secondary imagery dissemination means, communications equipment for message dispatch, and vehicles and aircraft for hardcopy delivery. I recommend we structure such a battalion with a "round-out" from the Reserves.


The imagery battalion probably would have a lower peacetime strength than needed for war. During war and exercises, we could augment the battalion with Reservists from the 24th MI Battalion Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance (MIBARS). The 24th MIBARS might be reorganized to conform to the recommended imagery battalion structure given here.

Summary

Operation DESERT STORM clearly identified the need for MI to better balance its capabilities among the intelligence disciplines. Without imagery products, the prosecution of DESERT STORM would have been degraded and casualty rates would have been higher. Our use of imagery-derived products hastened the total destruction of the Iraqi military, which led to the resounding victory in the Gulf War. Commanders not only knew the total disposition of the Iraqi forces, their defenses, and the terrain but they also had photographs of them. It's important to note, these same commanders and their staffs demanded more volume and frequency of products. The existing EAC structure could not satisfy their demands. Let's learn from this experience and structure an imagery EAC element that will meet these and future demands.

Colonel Robert H. Clegg is currently the Commander of the U.S. Army Central Security Facility, Fort Meade. He served as the Director, Joint Imagery Production Complex, CENTCOM, during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. He deployed from the United States Military Academy, where he was a professor of geography. Other assignments include G2, 56th FA Command (Pershing); Commander, Special Security Command, USAREUR; DA and OJCS staff officer; G2 Air in Vietnam; and tank platoon leader in Germany. Colonel Clegg is an Army War College graduate and holds a Ph.D. from the University of Maryland.

"Some 100 Guard members help Customs inspectors at ports and airports screen incoming passengers and cargo for concealed contraband."



FLORIDA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD: The Counter-Drug Role

By Lieutenant Colonel Stanley Shively, ARNG
and Major Arthur T. Coumbe, ARNG


Most of the cocaine coming into this country illegally comes through the Southeast corridor. U.S. Customs Service statistics show that more cocaine was seized in the Southeast over the last decade than in any other region, with Florida and Puerto Rico the main importation centers. The Southeast Region is one of seven Customs Service regions as shown in the map.

Florida federal law enforcement agencies (LEAs) enlisted the National Guard to help combat the illegal drug threat. Florida Army National Guard

(FLARNG) members are key players in this effort and conduct a wide variety of counter-drug missions:

- ☐ Divers from the 20th Special Forces Battalion (FLARNG) search the hulls of ships docked in Florida ports for "parasitic" attachments of cocaine and other illegal drugs.
- ☐ Volunteers help state and local police watch marijuana cultivation plots.
- ☐ Aerial platforms look for yet undetected marijuana cultivation sites.
- ☐ Instructors teach land navigation to state and local LEA personnel.

Cocaine Seizures by Region, FY 1990 in Pounds



"U.S. Customs Service statistics show that more cocaine was seized in the Southeast over the last decade than in any other region...."

Some 100 Guard members help Customs inspectors at ports and airports screen incoming passengers and cargo for concealed contraband. In 1990, Guard members were responsible for, or assisted in the seizure of, over 9 tons of cocaine. This is 21 percent of the regional and 11 percent of the total cocaine seized nationwide. Last fall, the Guard assisted in the second largest cocaine seizure in American history. Nearly 16 tons of cocaine were concealed in a Venezuelan shipment of concrete posts.

Intelligence support is vital to the Guard's involvement in the counter-drug effort. If current projections hold, it will increase in importance. Unlike other states, Florida assigns its National Guard analysts directly to LEA intelligence divisions rather than setting up separate units. Currently, unit intelligence personnel serve full-time with Customs, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and U.S. Coast Guard. Plans are to expand this program to include the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) and the Florida Law Enforcement Department.

Analytical and Linguistic Support

Guard MI provides both linguistic and analytical support. Linguists translate and transcribe docu-

ments and audio tapes related to current investigations. Although Spanish is the primary language, the Guard also provides Italian and Portuguese linguists to Florida-based LEAs. Linguist missions can last as short as a week or as long as several months. Guard linguists must have excellent English writing and language skills (as well as be capable linguists) because often they must present their findings in court.

MI analysts assigned to federal LEAs perform strategic and tactical tasks, including—

- ☐ Examining drug smuggling patterns and trends.
- ☐ Identifying new smuggling methods.
- ☐ Studying the structure of trafficking organizations.
- ☐ Writing strategic threat assessments.
- ☐ Disseminating tactical information to the field.
- ☐ Conducting both law enforcement and public record data base inquiries.
- ☐ Developing special data bases for money laundering.
- ☐ Performing telephone toll analyses.
- ☐ Correlating targeting information derived from surveillance.
- ☐ Coordinating with military interdiction entities to obtain and disseminate tactical intelligence for LEAs.

- ☐ Analyzing narco-terrorism trends and methods.
- ☐ Performing link analysis in support of criminal investigations.

"Operation WILDFIRE is designed to establish and refine new ways to organize local, state, and federal LEAs into effective counter-drug task forces."



Florida law enforcement intelligence organizations have given Guard analysts a great deal of responsibility. Shortly after one analyst reported for duty, he found himself in the middle of a major drug trafficking and money-laundering investigation which eventually resulted in the seizure of \$10 million in real estate. Another member, working as a statistical analyst, writes intelligence reports and estimates used in the allocation of regional and national resources. Other Guard members participate in operation DROP-IN. This is a combined FAA, Customs, and Florida Guard venture that identifies and takes out of circulation drug smuggling aircraft. In addition, members assigned to the FBI support two ongoing investigations involving narco-terrorist groups.

WILDFIRE

Operation WILDFIRE is designed to establish and refine new ways to organize local, state, and federal LEAs into effective counter-drug task forces. If adopted, this experiment will be a model for other drug trafficking centers. The project already has benefited from Guard expertise.

Although the DEA heads the Broward County task force, over 20 different law enforcement entities take part. The Army's Center for Low-Intensity Conflict coordinated WILDFIRE's military support. Guard analysts are helping develop an intelligence network targeted against the mid- and upper-levels of crack cocaine trafficking organizations in Broward County. Guard analysts are helping identify the crack cocaine leadership and targeting their assets. Beyond this, analysts provide long-term estimates and assessments—strategic intelligence. This ability is not always present in civilian LEA intelligence sections.

Organization, mission, and composition make the 260th MI Battalion (Linguist) suited for that special brand of low-intensity conflict known as counter-drug operations. Three of the battalion's missions are to provide CI, to interrogate prisoners of war, and to linguistically support designated commands.

The battalion consists of two companies with a small headquarters element, six interrogation teams, and six CI teams. A third company is scheduled to come on line in October. By 1995, the 260th may have five companies with slots for "pure" linguists, such as soldiers with a primary 97L MOS and an additional skill identifier for CI, interrogation, or SIGINT.

"Organization, mission, and composition make the 260th MI Battalion (Linguist) suited for that special brand of low-intensity conflict known as counter-drug operations."

Training

CI agents are at home in a counter-drug intelligence environment. LEA agent training parallels Army CI training. Both groups require expert knowledge of link analysis, background investigations, crime scene processing, physical evidence han-

ding, and surveillance techniques. This similarity in training results in a similarity in outlook allowing for the CI soldier to blend into the LEA organization.

The 260th brings another plus to the war on drugs. Many of its members are police and federal agents. In civilian life they work for DEA, Customs Service, ATF, Broward County Sheriff's Department, and the Coral Gables, Hialeah, Sweetwater, and Metro-Dade Police Departments. Their combined intelligence experience fosters an interchange of ideas about drug interdiction and the analytical techniques most useful in a counter-drug environment. It also exposes MI analysts to additional knowledge and skills making them more valuable to the LEA they're assigned to.

"...Guard members serving in the counter-drug program become (whether they like it or not) representatives of both the Guard and the LEA to which they're assigned."

Challenges

The battalion's participation has not been without challenges. One problem is the unit's newness—it was activated in October 1990. To be eligible for the full-time program, members must be MOS-qualified, have the requisite security clearance, and speak Latin American Spanish at the 2.2 level. (There are exceptions to this rule with certain positions requiring only MOS qualification and the appropriate security clearance.) Individuals with all three qualifications are at a premium, and will be until the battalion can fill its ranks with fully trained interrogators and CI agents.

Two facts impact the 260th's counter-drug mission. First, in the south Florida area, it's difficult to find MOS-qualified linguists with high-level clearances. Second, the demand for Spanish linguists to support missions in Central and South America is heavy. This tends to shrink the available pool of qualified individuals.

Another problem is access to classified and sensitive information. Initially, federal LEAs were hesitant about recognizing DOD and Guard security clearances. Much of this was due to friction between bureaucracies. To compound the problem, some federal officials wrongly believed

state authorities issued Guard clearances. This misconception was difficult to dispel. (However, it is only fair to add that DOD is equally hesitant about recognizing LEA-issued clearances.)

Frequently, federal LEAs restrict Guard access to criminal information data bases. LEAs withhold from military personnel any financial information about U.S. citizens. These constraints are understandable because no responsible official wants to compromise an investigation by handing over sensitive data to individuals who are not directly involved. However, such restrictions do impede our support to the intelligence effort.

Part of the problem is a lack of precise legal guidelines for military analysts to operate under. LEA personnel see Guard MI agents as being analysts not collectors. The distinction between analysis and collection is not as clear cut in practice as it is in theory. Moreover, Guard members serving in the counter-drug program become (whether they like it or not) representatives of both the Guard and the LEA to which they're assigned. The legal ramifications of this relationship have not been thoroughly explored. As a stopgap measure, the battalion commander oversees his analysts to make sure they don't exceed statutory bounds.

Communication

Another problem is the LEAs and the military interdiction authorities don't communicate well if at all. Before detailing the Guard's contribution in this arena, I want to discuss briefly the missions and functions of military command authorities.

Several years ago, the U.S. Congress commissioned DOD to help in the drug interdiction effort. DOD's mandate is twofold:

- ☐ Detect and monitor conveyances bringing illegal drugs into the U.S.
- ☐ Fuse command, control, communications, and intelligence collection resources devoted to the drug threat into a coherent system.

To accomplish the missions, DOD established three counter-drug joint task forces (JTFs), one of which is based in Key West, Florida. Its area of responsibility is the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean, and the eastern Pacific from Ecuador to Guatemala. Florida-based LEAs interact primarily with this task force.

Cooperation among federal LEAs is notoriously bad; but cooperation between them and the military services (as represented by the JTFs) is even worse. Formidable communications barriers intensify problems caused by institutional chauvinism. So different are the vocabularies, rank structures, operational procedures, and general in-

tellectual orientation that effective exchange of information is almost nonexistent

The Florida Guard's contribution to the solution of this dilemma is significant. They provide a semi-formal conduit between the LEAs and the military services. This enables the two groups to exchange information, promoting a harmonious working relationship. In the past, Guard intercession was the only way tactical intelligence found its way to the right place. Admittedly, a great deal remains to be done. But we have begun. At least we have established that it is smart to assign analysts directly to LEAs.

Moreover, Guard personnel help pass information among federal agencies themselves. Guard analysts maintain contact with colleagues attached to other organizations and regularly exchange ideas and impressions. This interchange proved so useful that it has been formalized. Once a month, Guard analysts in the south Florida area meet to exchange information, to discuss drug-trafficking trends, and to identify problem areas common to all. While operations are off-limits for discussion, the meetings have opened communication channels not only between Guard members but also among the supported agencies themselves, especially between the mid- and lower-levels of the various agencies.

"Because of its experience with the federal LEAs, the 260th can support any Latin American low-intensity conflict."

Patterns and Trends

Guard analysts can form estimates and assessments about long-term narco-trafficking patterns and trends, something their civilian counterparts are not trained to do. LEAs train their civilian analysts only to provide case support, such as criminal intelligence involving individuals and their connections with criminal organizations. The Army trains their MI analysts to provide another dimension to law enforcement—the assessment of patterns and trends. This dimension might prove only marginally useful in the apprehension of drug traffickers, but it is of great value to managers trying to decide where and how to commit scarce resources.

Assistance hasn't been a one-way street. If LEAs benefit from Guard assistance, then the Guard

benefits from LEA training. The payoffs have been many, but the principal one is FLARNG experience operating in the real-world.

Conventional wisdom teaches that "police" intelligence, the type useful in counter-drug operations, has limited applicability for military operations. However, the history of Western powers' brush-fire wars since 1945 indicates the opposite. In fact, in most low-intensity conflict environments, police intelligence has proven just as critical as military intelligence.

General Frank Kitson, the British counterinsurgency expert, asserts that police intelligence is more important. While commanding British forces in Northern Ireland, Kitson developed an extensive filing system—essentially a law enforcement data base. This led military traditionalists to complain that he was "waging war with filing cabinets." Kitson's successes in Kenya, Malaya, and Northern Ireland prove his critics wrong.

Summary

With competence and flexibility, the Guard makes three unique contributions in the war on drugs:

- ☐ Provides extensive language skills.
- ☐ Assesses patterns and trends.
- ☐ Acts as a conduit to bridge the communication gap between the LEAs and the military services.


In addition, MI support to drug interdiction provides excellent training for MI soldiers. Because of its experience with the federal LEAs, the 260th can support any Latin American low-intensity conflict.

Lieutenant Colonel Stanley Shively is the 260th's commander. He served 3 years on active duty during the Vietnam War and has served over 21 years with the FLARNG. Lieutenant Colonel Shively completed MIOAC and the Command and General Staff College. He lives in Lakeland, Florida, and works as a design engineer.

Major Arthur Coumbe is the commander of the battalion's A Company. His previous assignments include 1st Brigade S2, 24th Infantry Division (M), and Assistant Professor of Military Science, University of California, Berkeley. He completed the MIOAC and the Command and General Staff College. He now serves as an MI analyst attached to the Southeast Regional Intelligence Division of the U.S. Customs Service in Miami.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

We encourage readers with input of any kind concerning the material in MIPB to write a letter to the editor. Submissions should be legible, double spaced, and include the writer's name, address, and daytime phone number. Send letters to Commander, USAIC, ATSI-TDL-B, ATTN: Editor, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.



By Colonel Robert B. Mangold

The Washington Monument, the Lincoln Memorial, and Capital Hill were clearly visible off the left wing as we made our final approach into Washington National Airport. It was a clear, brisk day with temperatures in the 40's as we touched down. While it was good to be back on the ground, my mind turned to the serious business that lay ahead. Our Commandant, Major General Paul E. Menoher, Jr., had selected me to represent the MI Corps on the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) Accessions Board. This is a special challenge and responsibility because this board selects cadets for duty with the MI Corps. At stake, is the future quality of our officer corps.

Actually, we had been preparing for this since last year when I had the honor of representing our Corps on this same board. In addition to our usual means of publicity, we made a special effort at the Fort Lewis ROTC Advanced Camp this past summer to spell out the many opportunities MI has to offer.

The 14th MI Battalion (Tactical Exploitation) rolled out an outstanding display of tactical equipment and manned it with equally outstanding soldiers. The Intelligence Center complemented this effort with a high tech display featuring information about the Ground Station Module, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, high power microwaves, and the General Imagery Intelligence Training System. We wanted to show the breadth of opportunities MI has to offer and to convince as many cadets as possible to list MI as their first branch choice. We talked to nearly 5,000 cadets in groups of 100 over two 2-day periods, from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. As you will see, the hard work paid off.

Our board started with introductory briefings in the Total Army Personnel Command (TAPC) Conference Room. A files orientation followed the briefings. Other boards use a microfiche file but the ROTC Accessions Board uses paper files. Each file is a plain manila folder with a full-length picture, a

cadet data sheet, a record of camp performance including the regimental commander's recommendation, a college academic transcript, and a recommendation from the professor of military science. This is not a lot of information to base our decision on, but the best available under the circumstances. Cadets can influence what goes on the administrative data sheet by personalizing the remarks section of the Application for Active Duty, DA Form 4370-R.

The instructions to the board were clear. We used DA goals to branch minorities and females, to assure a balanced academic mix among branches, and to designate Regular Army (our ceiling was 55 percent). And we could detail up to 656 cadets. Our operating rules charged us to route files to the board members using cadet preference: 1st, 2d, 3d, 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, and free agent.

If the board member from the cadet's first branch choice selected the cadet for duty with that branch, the file was so marked and was not given to any other board members. If the board member did not select the cadet, the file was routed as indicated. Army Research Institute findings indicate lieutenants serving in their 1st, 2d, or 3d choice branches do better and serve longer than those serving in a 4th or lower choice. To be considered for RA, the cadet must request it and then the board member makes the call as to the individual's quality. For branch details, TAPC established numbers of slots to be detailed to particular branches. We selected volunteers first, tried to accommodate cadets' preferences, limited the number of females to be detailed, and provided an upper-, middle-, and lower-file mix.

The first chart shows the basic branch selections available to the FY 92 board. Although not reflected on this chart, MI will access 476 cadets during FY 92. The FY 91 board selected the remainder based on college graduation dates. Additional lieutenants will come into MI from the Officer Candidate School Program and West Point.

The ROTC selection board chart, on page 30,



BRANCH BOARD SELECTIONS

BRANCH	FY 92	FY 93	TOTAL
INFANTRY	88	89	177
ARMOR	58	52	110
FIELD ARTILLERY	121	91	212
AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY	68	37	105
AVIATION	102	75	177
ENGINEER	49	62	111
SIGNAL CORPS	170	112	282
MILITARY POLICE	44	32	76
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE	228	154	382
CHEMICAL	50	35	85
ADJUTANT GENERAL	42	41	83
FINANCE	10	13	23
ORDNANCE	136	84	220
QUARTERMASTER	148	79	227
TRANSPORTATION	86	44	130
MEDICAL SERVICE	225	40	265
TOTAL	1625	1040	2665

COMPUTER GRAPHICS: GARY BRILES

shows the results of our board deliberations. Just over 90 percent of the cadets selected for duty with MI had MI listed as their first, second, or third choice. We gave RA commissions to 238 MI cadets. This number cannot be compared with other branches because West Point graduates automatically receive an RA commission and most of these individuals go into combat arms branches. Of 17 branches, our cadets have the third highest college grade point average and score just above average in their ROTC Advanced Summer Camp.

The branch detail chart, on page 30, shows combined results of branch detailing for cadets selected for FY 92 and FY 93. Most of the cadets were aware of the branch detail program and indicated a preference for a detail branch. We accommodated every case we possibly could.

In summary, we are pleased with the officers who will soon join us as members of the MI Corps. They are of outstanding quality and have the sincere desire to serve with us. Next year this process

will repeat itself.

Regardless of your rank or where you serve, it is your responsibility to use every occasion to discuss with ROTC, as well as with West Point and OCS, cadets the outstanding career opportunities the MI Corps offers. Only by listing MI as "first choice" on DA Form 4370-R and DA Form 61 is a cadet assured the MI Branch board member will see his or her file before any other member sees it. The future of our officer corps is in your hands.

Colonel Robert B. Mangold received his commission through ROTC from Youngstown State University. He has attended the MIOBC and MIOAC, the Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College. He has a master's degree from Wayne State University. Colonel Mangold has been assigned as Deputy Commander, 501st MI Brigade, Korea; Commander, 14th MI Battalion, Fort Lewis, WA; Assistant to the Chief, MI Corps; and Deputy Chief of Staff, USAIC, Fort Huachuca. He currently is assigned as the Director, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, USAIC, Fort Huachuca.

ROTC SELECTION BOARD

TOP 3					HIGH TECH								
BR	PREF	RA	CAMP	GPA	SCI	ENG	BLK	HIS	OTH	FEM			
IN	97.7%	44	4.44	3.008	12	11	28	2	2	0			
AR	93.9%	67	4.37	2.892	9	9	18	2	4	0			
FA	88.1%	81	3.71	2.841	25	12	26	1	2	0			
AD	85.7%	35	3.63	2.946	8	13	8	1	3	27			
AV	100%	53	4.27	3.044	11	14	17	0	2	17			
EN	83.8%	34	3.94	2.988	14	66	20	0	0	27			
SC	70.8%	181	3.38	2.960	32	69	22	4	6	28			
MP	95.2%	51	4.20	3.291	2	2	8	1	1	17			
MI	90.1%	238	3.79	3.156	16	30	43	6	8	55			
CM	31.0%	54	3.24	2.844	38	15	6	0	0	15			
AG	73.5%	55	3.54	3.004	2	0	8	0	2	19			
FI	100%	14	4.09	3.274	0	0	3	0	0	10			
OD	68.6%	116	3.50	2.936	38	37	14	5	6	36			
QM	43.2%	136	3.34	2.849	24	18	17	3	3	35			
TC	62.6%	83	3.38	3.104	18	16	13	2	4	25			
MS	75.4%	134	3.66	2.986	81	18	30	8	11	72			
AN	100%	62	3.46	3.020	0	0	19	3	3	92			
TOTAL	79.9%	1438	3.76	3.00	330	330	300	38	57	475			


50.0%

BRANCH DETAIL COMBINED FY 92/93

FROM → BRANCH		SC	MI	AG	FI	OD	QM	TC	TOTAL
TO DETAIL BRANCH	FA	74	86	20	4	74	78	20	356
	AR	34	42	16	3	27	30	16	168
	IN	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	5
	AD	13	25	10	2	12	12	10	84
	CM	8	11	4	2	7	7	4	43
TOTAL: MALE/FEMALE		130/11	166/15	52/6	11/2	120/10	127/10	50/6	656/60

BIG BUSINESS: Intelligence in Patton's Third Army

By Captain Michael E. Bigelow



Unlike its World War I predecessor, the American Army of 1944 had a mature intelligence system. Built on foundations laid in 1918, the system had intelligence staffs at all levels from army to battalion. Organizations and procedures were standardized. Doctrinal publications had grown from four in 1939 to over two dozen. More importantly, the staffs were trained. Some were trained in maneuvers in the U.S., while others had valuable combat experience from North Africa and the Mediterranean. One of the most effective and successful of these staffs was the Third Army's G2.

The success of the Third Army's G2 was based on the relationship between Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Third Army Commander, and Colonel Oscar W. Koch, his G2. These two men respected and trusted each other. Koch earned respect by providing Patton with an accurate picture of enemy capabilities. He and his section used every source available to collect information, and then remained objective in their assessment of the enemy.

Patton and his G2

Although the flamboyant and gregarious Patton and the modest and soft-spoken Koch offered a dramatic contrast, they made an effective team. Bespectacled, balding, and heavy-set, Koch looked more like a kindly old college professor than one of Patton's closest advisors. But his appearance belied a perceptive mind and a keen understanding of intelligence. These qualities, combined with deep loyalty to Patton, made Koch almost indispensable. So valuable was Koch to Patton, that whenever the general assumed a new command, he brought Koch along as his G2.

The Patton-Koch relationship began in the late thirties, when both served as Army Cavalry School instructors. In August 1940, when Patton took command of the 2d Armored Division, he placed Koch on the divisional staff. Later, Koch became the division's G2. When Patton took command of II Corps in March 1943, Koch accompanied him to Tunisia.

Koch was Patton's G2 during the planning of the

PHOTO REFERENCES U.S. ARMY

"Although the flamboyant and gregarious Patton and the modest and soft-spoken Koch offered a dramatic contrast, they made an effective team."

Sicilian invasion. During this month-long campaign, Koch gained invaluable experience as an Army G2. In January 1944, Patton took command of the Third Army in England. A month later, Koch assumed the G2 position. By August 1944, when the Third Army became operational, Koch had almost 2 years' experience as Patton's G2.

Patton knew the value of intelligence. Willing to take risks and exploit unexpected openings, he was the kind of commander who wanted to know everything about the enemy. As a result, he never let the G2 fade into the background. He included Koch in his inner planning group, which often consisted of only two other officers. Koch always had his say.

Perhaps because of Koch's tutoring, Patton knew it wasn't easy to get information on the enemy. Intelligence was more than guesswork supported by "occult powers." Patton understood that good intelligence took time and hard work. So "in Patton's commands," Koch wrote, "intelligence was always viewed as **big business** and treated accordingly."¹

The two officers worked well together, developing a mutual understanding. After awhile, Koch could anticipate his commander's requirements. Only once did Patton personally express his intelligence requirements.² Yet Patton never complained that Koch wasn't giving him the right information; instead, he praised Koch for giving him what he needed.

G2, Third U.S. Army

Koch used his North African and Sicilian experience to reorganize the Third Army's G2. His section consisted of five functional branches: Administration, Combat Intelligence, G2 Air, Security, and Auxiliary Agencies. Although the G2 itself was relatively small, with only 19 officers and 25 enlisted men, it ballooned to over 400 officers and men with attachments. Most of these attachments came from the theater's Military Intelligence Service (MIS). Koch and Colonel Robert S. Allen, his assistant G2, formed a small executive group to coordinate and supervise the intelligence staff.³

Administration Branch. This branch handled the G2's routine personnel and logistic matters. It also served as a clearing house for intelligence products. It received and distributed reports from higher headquarters, and disseminated G2 products. In short, it allowed the other branches to concentrate on intelligence collection and production.

Combat Intelligence Branch. This was the hub of the G2. It collected, processed, and produced in-

telligence for the Third Army. The branch maintained G2 situation maps and charts, conducted briefings, and exchanged tactical information with subordinate and higher headquarters. It also prepared intelligence estimates, periodic reports, and other studies. An order of battle team from the MIS, specially trained on the German Army, augmented the branch.

G2 Air. While in the Mediterranean, intelligence staffs found aerial reconnaissance so valuable that it required a separate coordinating section. G2 Air, under Colonel Harold M. Forde, was the result. It produced and disseminated intelligence from visual and photographic aerial reconnaissance. With only a small planning group at army headquarters, the rest of the branch was with the XIX Tactical Army Command (TAC), the Third Army's air component. At the XIX Tactical Army Command command post, the air reconnaissance coordinating officer consolidated corps and army air reconnaissance requests. At the airfields, ground liaison officers briefed and debriefed pilots and disseminated the results. At the photo squadron's airfield, MIS teams manned the photo center, interpreting photographs and preparing reports.


Security Branch. Like G2 Air, the Security Branch benefitted from previous combat experience, where CI had a direct relationship with combat operations. This branch's task was to deny information about the Third Army to the enemy. It published CI directives, arranged security training, and issued passwords and replies. Counterintelligence Corps attachments helped the branch maintain security.

Auxiliary Agencies. The Auxiliary Agencies Branch was small, but important. It supervised and coordinated the use of intelligence attachments to the G2. It received and disseminated these teams' reports.

Two other staff elements coordinated signals intelligence for the G2. Although part of the Third Army's signal section, the Signal Intelligence Service worked with the G2 to coordinate all radio intelligence within the army. It controlled tasking and reporting of the army's 118th Radio Intelligence Company and the corps' signal service companies. The British Special Liaison Unit received and distributed ULTRA intelligence, the system for breaking the highest German radio codes.

While each G2 branch was specialized, Koch believed "the concept of a G2 team was of critical importance."⁴ This team moved to France in early July and became operational in August 1944. Over the next 9 months, the G2 became more and more efficient as it gained experience.

G2, THIRD U.S. ARMY



Collecting Information

A 1945 study claims army-level G2s rated POWs and aerial reconnaissance as the most profitable intelligence sources, followed by radio intelligence and agent reports. While Koch favored aerial reconnaissance, he believed no source should be left unused. As a result, the G2 used human, imagery, and signals intelligence.⁵

Troops in Contact. Third Army soldiers in contact with the enemy were invaluable G2 information sources. Koch believed the divisions were "best equipped to provide intelligence information gained through physical contact with the enemy." Divisional troops captured prisoners, observed the enemy, and sent patrols. Koch noted, divisions were "the keystone to combat intelligence."⁶

Besides divisional troops, Koch relied on corps and army cavalry groups to gather information. Fulfilling the traditional cavalry roles, these groups provided information on enemy strength and terrain conditions. The 6th Cavalry Group, under Colonel Edward M. Fickett, played a unique role. Converted

into an information service, Fickett's group followed closely behind frontline units, visited headquarters, and monitored radio nets. They reported their G2 and G3 information to Third Army's advanced command post. Fickett's service gave both Patton and Koch a rapid and reliable information source.

Prisoners of War. POWs were by far the most important single intelligence source. By one estimate, over one-third of all combat intelligence came from POWs during World War II. This success stemmed from the great number of German prisoners: Four army interrogator teams could handle over 5,000 prisoners a day. An incident in December 1944 proved the value of prisoner interrogation.⁷

As Patton prepared to assault the Siegfried Line, the G2 learned a captured German general knew of the defensive line facing the Third Army. After Koch found out the German was cooperative, he arranged to have the G2 question him. As it turned out, not only did the general know about the defenses, but he had helped build them. Working

on maps and aerial photography supplied by Koch's section, the German pinpointed enemy defenses and weak spots. Once verified, the G2 placed this data on overprinted maps and prepared to distribute them to all units. Unfortunately, the Battle of the Bulge interrupted the Third Army's use of this intelligence; instead, the G2 gave it to the Seventh Army, which used it to great advantage.⁸

The Office of Strategic Services. By 1944, each army had a special intelligence detachment from the OSS. At Third Army, the G2 and the detachment had an excellent relationship. The OSS detachment recruited agents and inserted them behind German lines to gather information. The detachment successfully sent over 100 missions behind enemy lines and provided invaluable information to the G2. After the war, the G2 praised the detachment's "wide versatility and great value."⁹


Aerial Reconnaissance. The Third Army's deep collection asset was the XIX TAC's 10th Reconnaissance Group, and Koch was adept at using it. Through his G2 Air, he sent planes out to 150 miles in front of the army. Aerial observation brought in information on enemy movements and troop concentrations. During the Third Army's dash across France, this observation was so effective that the Germans were never able to mass forces to threaten the army's exposed flank. Aerial photography, the other part of aerial reconnaissance, provided more detailed information on terrain and enemy defenses. Photography was especially useful in locating artillery positions. In one case, before a XII Corps attack in November 1944, photo intelligence was so accurate it pinpointed 221 enemy artillery positions, allowing Third Army preparatory fire to obliterate them.

Perhaps Koch's greatest use of aerial reconnaissance came on the eve of the Battle of the Bulge. Concerned about the constant withdrawal of German armor forces from the front lines since October, Koch wanted to fly reconnaissance missions in the Eifel region, directly in front of the First Army. After getting permission, the G2 requested aerial surveillance of Eifel's railroad marshalling yards and highway intersections. In November, despite poor flying weather, photo interpreters traced the progress of hundreds of railroad trains carrying armor and vehicles. This buildup so concerned

Koch that, on December 9, he briefed Patton that the Germans had the capability to launch a spoiling offensive. This capability became reality a week later as the Germans smashed through thin American lines in the Ardennes: Aerial reconnaissance and Koch had earned their pay.¹⁰

Radio Intelligence. Radio intelligence was the most profitable collection source, after POWs and aerial reconnaissance. Working with smaller corps companies, the 300-man 118th Radio Intelligence Company intercepted German radio traffic, located outstations, and conducted traffic and cryptanalysis. The 118th also coordinated the work of the corps companies and disseminated combat information to the G2. As the campaign progressed, the G2 got better at integrating this information into the general intelligence picture.

Radio intelligence proved useful in fluid situations like the breakout across France in August 1944. Using information from panzer and panzer grenadier divisions, the Third Army's radio intelligence companies pieced together their order of battle and followed their movements. On August 5, they found the 2d SS Panzer and 2d Panzer divisions in the Mortain area before the German counterattack. A week later, radio intelligence provided locations of several divisions in the Falaise pocket. It also showed German unit movement east through the Falaise-Argentan Gap. The 118th continued to produce useful intelligence until early October.¹¹



"Patton was so impressed by the value of ULTRA that he never passed up a special briefing."

ULTRA. The Third Army's window into strategic signals intelligence was Major Melvin C. Helfers, its ULTRA representative. He evaluated the intelligence, presented it to Patton and Koch, and helped fuse it with other intelligence. Although ULTRA gave several dramatic warnings of German counterattacks, it mainly acted as a guide and critic to the mass of information from other sources. It fit in well with Koch's concept of all-source intelligence.

Major Helfers presented the ULTRA intelligence in daily 0900 briefings. Besides Patton and Koch, only six other officers were authorized to receive the briefing. Using a special situation map, Helfers gave the information from notes using frequent map references. Except for strength estimates, he used information from other G2 sources to develop the most complete intelligence picture possible. Patton was so impressed by the value of ULTRA that he never passed up a special briefing.

Koch also showed interest in ULTRA intelligence. In making his estimates, he asked Helfers to prepare enemy strength maps and figures. The major could bring an urgent ULTRA message to Koch at any time. If necessary, Koch called it to the attention of the G3 or the chief of staff.¹²

For the Third Army G2, no one source of information dominated—all were important. One asset's limitation was compensated for by another's strength. If poor weather grounded 10th Reconnaissance Group planes, the G2 could gather information from prisoners, OSS agents, ULTRA, and troops in contact. Besides complementing each other, sources supplemented each other. For example, the Signal Intelligence Service got frequencies and call signs through interrogation and captured document teams. The result of this all-source effort was a balanced and flexible Third Army collection system.

Remaining Objective

A balanced collection effort helped Koch accurately estimate the enemy situation. But, more important, his thinking was always clear and detached. In late July 1944, the Allies broke out of the Normandy beachhead. In August and September, the American First and Third Armies raced across France. The Allies were optimistic the war would soon end.

Yet Koch remained cautious. On August 28, 1944, he issued G2 Estimate Number 9, in which he reported that despite huge losses, the Germans maintained a cohesive front and had not been routed. Koch reported they were still bringing new units into the battle, although this didn't give them

new offensive power. With weather and terrain on their side, Koch believed the Germans would play for time and wage a last-ditch struggle. For Koch, the war wasn't over yet.¹³

As the Allies approached the German border, German resistance stiffened and the Allied advance slowed to a crawl. Yet, optimism remained. Intelligence officers believed the heavy fighting was sapping the Germans' strength, and they would not have the force left for an offensive action.

However, Koch watched throughout the autumn. By the end of October, he noticed the Germans were withdrawing panzer forces from the front and were building up forces in Eifel opposite the First Army. Because the forces in Eifel could threaten the Third Army projected offensive toward Frankfurt, Koch paid close attention to them. During November, he kept a close aerial eye on Eifel. In mid-December, Koch warned Patton of a German counteroffensive.¹⁴

During the heady days of August and September and into the autumn of 1944, Koch was objective in his assessments of German capabilities. He relied on his collected information, not the prevailing optimism, to make his estimates. Equally important, he didn't get careless in his collection effort toward potential Third Army threats. While not directly facing Patton's army, German forces in Eifel would threaten it as it advanced east. So Koch gathered information on them.

"By using all-source information and keeping a clear mind, Koch was remarkably accurate in judging German capabilities."

Assessing Capabilities

Koch believed intelligence estimates should consider enemy capabilities, not intentions. "No matter what the intentions of the enemy might be," Koch stated, "he must have the capabilities to execute them; the converse is not true. He may have the capabilities and yet not execute them for reasons of his own." To determine enemy capabilities, Koch looked at weather, terrain, and enemy strength and disposition. By using all-source information and keeping a clear mind, Koch was remarkably accurate in judging German capabilities.¹⁵

During the December 9 briefing, Koch briefed German force capabilities in Eifel. By Koch's reck-

oning, the Germans had nine divisions (four in contact) facing the First Army VIII Corps. That was two and a half more divisions in equivalent strength than stood against the entire Third Army. Koch concluded the German divisions could either meet threats from the First or Third Armies, divert Allied reinforcements to the Eifel, or launch a spoiling or diversionary attack.

Several factors favored the last capability. The Germans had a tactical reserve of 105 tanks in two panzer divisions in Eifel. Of the nine divisions, the five in reserve were rested and refitted. To support ground forces, the Germans had marshalled 1,000 fighters. And while the terrain was unfavorable for Allied winter operations, it was favorable to a German offensive.

Koch's briefing was followed by a short silence, and then discussion. Plans were already underway for the Third Army operation toward Frankfurt. Nothing would interfere with that. But "limited outline planning" would begin to meet the potential German spoiling attack. Patton wanted to "be in a position to meet whatever happens." Later, Patton would use the outline planning to counter a German threat bigger than even Koch calculated.¹⁶

In 10 days, Patton had his army shift the attack's direction and rip into the southern flank of a 20-division German counteroffensive. By Christmas, the Third Army relieved the besieged Bastogne, a critical road junction, and had driven a salient into the German's exposed flank. With the relief, the tide had swung against the Germans.

It is true, Patton did not change his offensive plans because Koch briefed him on a potential threat to the north. However, by telling Patton of a potential threat's capabilities, Koch started his commander and staff thinking about how to react to such a situation. And it was the Third Army's rapid shift of direction that broke the back of the German's counteroffensive in the south.

Conclusions

Although the Battle of the Bulge provides the most specific examples, the Third Army's G2 was successful throughout its 9-month campaign across Europe. Through the G2's all-source collection and objective assessments of the enemy's capabilities, the Third Army was never shocked into inaction and could take advantage of vulnerable sectors in the enemy's lines.

Patton gave the credit for this success to Colonel Koch. "I ought to know what I'm doing," he once commented, "I have the best damned intelligence officer in any United States command."¹⁷ With this attitude, it's not surprising that whenever

Patton assumed a new command, Koch shortly followed as his G2.

Koch, in turn, gave much credit to his commander for the G2's effectiveness. According to Koch, Patton gave his G2 support, both in terms of interest in intelligence and knowledge of its complexities. Armed with this support, Koch knew that Patton would use, or at least listen to, the intelligence that he and his section had so painstakingly produced. "What the intelligence officer needs most to help him through his day-to-day chores," Koch noted, "is command support."¹⁸


Perhaps in this mutual admiration is the most important lesson from the Third Army's G2: The foundation of a successful intelligence system is a close relationship between the commander and G2/S2 built on mutual respect and trust. On one hand, the intelligence officer must know his commander will respect his efforts. The commander, on the other hand, must be able to trust his intelligence officer to give him products that are accurate and complete enough to merit such respect. Without this mutual respect, both the officers and their unit are the losers.

Endnotes

1. Oscar W. Koch with Robert G. Hay, *G-2: Intelligence for Patton* (Philadelphia: An Army Times Publishing Company Book, 1971), 165.
2. Koch, 53-54.
3. For the G2 organization see Koch, 123-126 and "After Action Report, Third U.S. Army, 1 August 1944-9 May 1945," vol. II, "G-2" (Part 3), 1.
4. Koch, 123.
5. "A Study of Operations of G-2 (Intelligence Branch) in the 12th Army Group," 1 July 1945, 36.
6. Koch, 135-136.
7. United States Forces, European Theater, General Board, "The Military Intelligence Service in the European Theater of Operations," (Study no. 12), 29; "A Study," 18.
8. Koch, 76-77.
9. *The Overseas Targets: War Report of the OSS*, vol. 2 (New York: Walker and Co., 1976), 217-218; "A Study," 36.
10. United States Forces, European Theater, General Board, "The Utilization of Tactical Air Force Reconnaissance Units..." (Study no. 19), 9-12; Robert S. Allen, *Lucky Forward: The History of Patton's Third U.S. Army* (New York, The Vanguard Press, 1947), 167; Koch, 78-82.
11. "Third Army Radio Intelligence History" (SRH-045), 31-34.
12. For ULTRA in the Third Army see "Reports by U.S. Army ULTRA Representatives with Army Field Commands" (SRH-023); "Report on Assignment with Third United States Army, 15 August-18 September 1944 (Major Warrack Wallace, USA)" (SRH-108).
13. Forrest Pogue, *The Supreme Command* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, DA, 1954), 244-245.
14. Pogue, 306; Koch, 78-86.
15. Koch, 42-43.
16. Koch, 85-87.
17. Fred Ayer, Jr., *Before the Colors Fade* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964), 175.
18. Koch, 165.

Captain Michael E. Bigelow is the Intelligence Center's military history instructor. He served as a tank battalion S2, assistant brigade S2, and All-Source Production Section chief in the 1st ID (M), Fort Riley, Kansas. He is a graduate of Colorado State University and has a master's degree in history from Temple University.

CONSTRUCTION at the home of MILITARY INTELLIGENCE



The two Inset photos show a closer view of the construction of new facilities at Fort Huachuca.



The aerial photograph above shows the construction of the new facilities at Fort Huachuca, which include: (A) Test and Experimentation Command (TEXCOM); (B&C) Tactical Training Area, Pads, and Building; (D) Morse Collection Department/EW Cryptology and Security; (E) SIGINT/EW Maintenance; (F) Central AC Plant; (G) Dining Hall; and (H-K) Barracks.

INSET PHOTOS: SPECIALIST RON G. BELSER, JR.

PROPONENT NOTES



Distinguished Members of the Corps: MI's Worldwide Ambassadors

The Military Intelligence Corps was activated on July 1, 1987, in accordance with AR 600-82, the U.S. Army Regimental System. Under its provisions, the Proponent appoints an Honorary Colonel and Sergeant Major of the Corps to provide a link with history for today's soldiers.

On July 1, 1988, the MI Corps Hall of Fame was established as a means of honoring those soldiers and civilians who, through their performance of duty, have made exceptionally significant contributions to the MI profession. A select few Hall of Fame members are chosen to assist the Honorary Colonel and Sergeant Major with their duties as spokesmen and ambassadors for the Corps. These ambassadors are the Distinguished Members of the Corps (DMOCs).

DMOCs work to perpetuate the heritage, traditions, and history of the MI Corps. They make public appearances and speeches on behalf of the Corps and participate in a variety of functions. They provide input on history and heritage to the Chief of the Corps.

DMOCs are selected because they have dedicated their professional careers to improving the MI profession through their significant and lasting contributions to both the MI Corps and the Army. As ambassadors of our Corps, we view these individuals as the most prominent MI figures available to the public to relay information about the history, development, and future of MI. These individuals have a wealth of knowledge from personal experience which is unavailable in research materials. We encourage MI units, other military organizations, both Active and Reserve, as well as university ROTC programs to solicit these distinguished professionals as guest speakers.

Following is a list of Distinguished Members of the Corps and their addresses:

Lieutenant General Sidney T. Weinstein (Retired)
11936 Holly Branch Court
Great Falls, Maryland 22066

Command Sergeant Major Louis H. Rothenstein (Retired)
1321 Webster Street, Apt. D-109
Alameda, California 94051

Major General James E. Freeze (Retired)
5415D Backlick Road
Springfield, Virginia 22151

Major General George A. Godding (Retired)
1507 Hampton Hills Circle
McLean, Virginia 22101

Command Sergeant Major George W. Howell, Jr. (Retired)
12306 Herrington Manner Drive
Silver Spring, Maryland 20705

Major William I. Jennings (Retired)
4013 Hunsinger Lane
Louisville, Kentucky 40220

Chief Warrant Officer Ann M. McDonough (Retired)
146 Boco Ciega Point South
Madeira Beach, Florida 33708

Lieutenant General William E. Potts (Retired)
1872 N. Patrick Henry Dr.
Arlington, Virginia 22203

Colonel Abraham Sinkov (Retired)
11207 S. Talavi Lane
Phoenix, Arizona 85044

Major General Edmund R. Thompson (Retired)
3 Bayberry Avenue
Kennebunk, Maine 04043

Colonel William F. Vernau (Retired)
895 Dietrick Court
Newark, Ohio 43055

Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters (Retired)
222 Plantation Road
Palm Beach, Florida 33480

Colonel Norman S. Wells (Retired)
5707 North 9th Road
Arlington, Virginia 22205

Lieutenant General James A. Williams (Retired)
8928 Maurice Lane
Annandale, Virginia 22003

Lieutenant General Samuel V. Wilson (Retired)
P.O. Box 98
Rice, Virginia 23966

For more information, contact Hall of Fame project officer Captain Kelly Crosby at AUTOVON 821-1180 or Commercial (602) 533-1180. You may write her at Commander, USAIC, ATTN: ATSI-MI, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.

Officer Notes

Because of the shortage of MI officers, we are experiencing problems developing Must Fill for the FY 93 Officer Distribution Plan. We use the MI Proponent development Must Fill as a management tool to get the right grade of officer into key positions. MI is short of majors now and lieutenant colonels in the future. This shortage has hampered efforts to fill our designated Must Fill positions. We are working with the MACOMs to match the identified Must Fill positions to the inventory.

There is currently a proposal to convert Field Artillery battalion S2 positions from FA to MI. The FA School's combat developments proposed this conversion as a result of the FA's recognized need to have an intelligence professional in the FA battalion's targeting process. The schools are currently working out the details. Both FA Proponent's Major General Franks and MI Proponent's Major General Menoher support this proposal. Once documented, we will include the positions in the Must Fill process.

The MI Aviator-15C35

The 15C35, All-Source Intelligence Aviator, track provides an exciting career path and professional development opportunity for MI officers and aviators. The Aviation Branch selects officers for 15C35 training either during Aviation Officer Basic Course/Initial Entry Rotary Wing or immediately before going to Aviation Officer Advanced Course. The Aviation Branch judges candidates on their established performance and potential. MI officers should request this branch transfer before attending Aviation Officer Advanced Course. They must pass the Class I flight physical and Flight Aptitude Selection Test. Selectees for this career track attend MIOAC and non-MI officers attend the MI Officer Transition course before going to MIOAC.

Officers in this career track will be all-source intelligence qualified. Depending on its needs, the Army will select some officers for the Fixed Wing Multi-engine Qualification Course, the Special Electronic Mission Aircraft Qualification Course, or the Rotary Wing Intelligence Course. The Army selects officers for fixed wing transition based on demonstrated performance and the number of years available for utilization following training. This

is an important point because there is a misconception in the field that all 15C35 officers are fixed wing pilots. **This is not true.** All 15C35 officers are all-source intelligence aviators. The Army selects officers for the 15C35 track based on their desire to be Intelligence aviators, not on their desire to be fixed wing pilots.

Officers adopting the aviation/intelligence career track can expect an exciting, challenging career. They serve as aerial exploitation battalion pilots, QUICKFIX pilots, commanders, staff officers, and divisional aviation brigade and battalion S2s. Authorizations for 15C35's only go through the rank of lieutenant colonel. Therefore, it is imperative that officers in this track stay competitive with their MI counterparts so that at the senior grades they will be competitive for key MI assignments.

Following Aviation Branch qualification, 15C35's should try to alternate between 15C35 and 35 series assignments. 15C35 officers are competitive for any 35 series job that is commensurate with their grade and skill. Currently, several 15C35 officers are commanding, or have been selected to command, MI units. PERSCOM selected them because of their MI experience and performance in both aviation and MI assignments. Officers in this career track need to work closely with their PERSCOM assignments officer to ensure they get the necessary mix of MI and aviation experience to stay competitive for selection and promotion.

To make this career track successful, the MI Branch depends on both aviation and MI senior officers to recognize the skills and professional development needs of 15C35 officers. Because 15C35 officers need to be competitive in both aviation and MI, it is important they don't waste their time in inconsequential positions. Only the highest quality officers are selected for this career track, and senior leaders are encouraged to educate junior officers about this program. We welcome questions and comments from the field about this program. Direct your questions to the Office of the Chief of MI at AUTOVON 821-1180/1181, or write to Commander, USAIC, ATTN: ATSI-MI, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.

Enlisted Notes

As with the rest of the MI Corps, enlisted soldiers will see a dramatic change in their futures. The downsizing will have its effect on our Corps, but the gains made during the Gulf War for the MI NCO and the MI soldier will benefit our future Army. Many new systems requiring highly skilled and technically oriented soldiers will enter the MI inventory, and

the MI soldier has a pivotal and important part to play. The Proponent's mission is to make sure we thoroughly evaluate any decision affecting a soldier's future.

Many upcoming changes affect our 96 CMF soldiers. A critical change for MOS 96H will occur as the MOHAWK aircraft is deleted from the Army inventory. In the near future, 96H missions and duties will focus on J-STARS and UAV.

The much discussed transition of the 97G to Multidiscipline Counterintelligence (MDCI) Analyst is still ongoing and will be completed in the mid-1993 fiscal year. This transition from a pure counter-SIGINT soldier to an MDCI soldier will take place through mobile training teams and unit training. The first step in this transition will be a change to **AR 611-201, Enlisted Career Management Fields and Military Occupational Specialties**. We will send this to DA by the end of the second quarter of FY 92.

As most of you know, the Intelligence Center and the Intelligence School at Fort Devens are consolidating their missions and functions at the Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca. This will occur in a series of time-phased unit and function moves. It will start in the latter part of FY 93 and end with the official transfer of the headquarters at Fort Devens in late 1994. The following is a synopsis of the transition and the projected date of the move starting from Fort Devens:

- ☐ Phase I. Forward Transition Support Element, July 1992.
- ☐ Phase II. Electronic Warfare Training, January 1993; Morse Code Training, October 1993; and Maintenance Training, June 1994.
- ☐ Phase III. Rear Detachment Closes, to be determined.

Language

As indicated in the January-March MIPB, we're carefully looking at establishing linguist MOSs for the Reserve Component as well as the Active Component. We are designing the RC linguist MOS proposal to create a pool of highly skilled linguists. They will be specifically trained and experienced in translation and interpretation as well as being familiar with HUMINT, CI, and, possibly, SIGINT. These linguists could, upon mobilization or other taskings, be assigned to complete language-related missions, thereby allowing AC linguists to work in their primary MOSs.

We are gathering training and force structure information to add Language Support Teams to the 300th MI Brigade's existing force structure and its subordinate language battalions located in Utah,

California, Louisiana, Washington, and Florida. These language teams could deploy as separate subunits to help the AC or other government agencies. As a natural follow-on, we are also examining the possibility of applying the RC linguist MOS initiative to the AC. As a first step, we're researching MOS 97B (CI Agent) and MOS 97E (Interrogator) for language requirements.

If feasible, a combined HUMINT MOS and a language MOS may emerge, both of which would be language required. Soldiers in the language MOS would be translators and interpreters. Also, with further MI training, they would be available to use their language skills in other MI MOSs. These soldiers would have a meaningful life cycle program, including enhanced language training and practice to maintain their skills. We will keep you posted on further developments in future issues of this bulletin.

Civilian Notes

Under CIPMS, CPO classifies positions using the Primary Grading Standard. The Army Occupational Guides complement this standard and are specific to the various CIPMS career fields. HQDA has published and distributed the following Army Occupational Guides (AOG) for implementation: GS-1701/1712; GS-0132 (Operations); GS-0132 (Production); multiseries (Scientific and Technical Intelligence, Production); and GS-0080. HQDA has submitted the AOG for GS-0132 (Intelligence and Threat Support) for approval; and we expect to see it published this spring. The Proponent has written the AOG for GS-0132 (Combat Developments) and the Intelligence Personnel Management Office is staffing it. We expect to have a final approved product to the field for implementation this summer.

The Army Civilian Training Education and Development System Plan for Career Program 35 specifies the competency levels needed by CIPMS (GS-0132 and GS-0080) employees by grade. The entry level competencies are the foundation for all additional training as well as continued development and growth as Intelligence professionals. Careerists can best achieve these competencies through attendance at MIOBC.

While we have a separate graduation criteria for civilians as opposed to lieutenants, we strongly encourage civilians to participate in as many training programs as they can. We have seen an increasing number of civilians attending MIOBC in the past few classes and are pleased with their professionalism and participation both in and outside of class.

CAREER NOTES

By Lieutenant Colonel William T. Torpey

We're about to enter uncharted waters. For the first time in most of our careers we will experience force reductions of unprecedented proportions. Today's officer corps is facing a gauntlet of draconian promotion board screenings: Lieutenant retention boards, RIFs, expanded selective early retirement boards (SERBs), and alluring voluntary separation incentives (VSIs) that seriously challenge the career aspirations of even our most dedicated officers.

Since these boards were announced, we've been inundated with calls from our officers requesting Manner of Performance assessments to help them make the tough decision to stay or leave the Active duty Army. Our commitment to each MI officer is total objective candor—even if it hurts. Be assured, we are here to assist you with this most difficult decision.

Projected Reduction In Force Boards ***Subject to Change*** (As of Jan 92)		
FY	TARGET YEAR GROUPS	
	Fld Grade	Co Grade
92	78	82
93	79	83/84
94	80	85

Things to Remember

The truth is literally changing every day. We will tell you what we know, no holds barred. What we don't know is who the boards will select for SERB or RIF or how deep the cuts will go into our center of mass officer population as each year group is sized. We will do our best to keep you informed throughout this process.

The SERB/RIF will be painful for everyone. The chain of command **must** take a personal interest in officers **in the zone** for any board. We will assist from our end.

We cannot guarantee any assignments for this summer, particularly for field grade officers. We anticipate major turmoil as a result of SERB/RIF. We cannot anticipate what priorities will influence assignments later in the year. Keep this in mind and bear with us. Some of you will be asked to move earlier than anticipated, and to places you may not like. Be prepared. It's coming.

Know your own file. Write for your microfiche and review your efficiency reports. Understand your manner of performance and your assignment history and where you stand in relation to your contemporaries. Get your chain of command involved. We have officers with great files concerned about the SERB/RIF as well as officers who don't know they may be at risk.

For those who weather this storm over the next few years, there are calm waters ahead. We expect our smaller, fully capable Army to provide the same ratio of professional development opportunities it did before the drawdown.

The Army Personnel Reduction Plan

Since the release of the implementing instructions for the SERB, RIF, VSI, and voluntary early release/retirement program (VER/RP), we were again besieged with phone calls from officers looking for more details on one or more of the programs. In most cases, the information officers are looking for is contained in message traffic or within the chain teaching material distributed to each command. You can help reduce the volume of calls by widely distributing the following messages within your organization. Please make sure your officers have read and understand them. This will help us keep the lines open for priority file assessment calls.

DTG	Message Title
182300Z Nov 91	FY 92 Selective Early Retirement Boards
201200Z Dec 91	FY 92 SERB - Update Number 2
062242Z Dec 91	Selective Early Retirement Post Board Policy

(Continued)

DTG	Message Title
202100Z Dec 91	Voluntary Incentive Programs to Support Army Drawdown
031600Z Jan 92	Reduction-in-Force Boards
101100Z Jan 92	Reduction-in-Force Board PCS Policy
071639Z Jan 92	Voluntary Incentive Programs to Support Army Drawdown—Army Competitive Category Officers
171320Z Jan 92	FY 92 Officer Voluntary Early Release/Retirement Program

In addition, MI Branch now publishes a quarterly newsletter which provides updates on the latest assignment opportunities, professional development programs, board announcements and analysis, and anything else that's hot in the personnel management and career development field. We distribute the newsletter to MI brigade and battalion commanders and senior intelligence officers at each installation for their use and for local distribution.

For more information on any of these issues, call MI Branch at AUTOVON 221-0143/0145 or Commercial (703) 325-0143/0145, or write to Commander, PERSCOM, ATTN: TAPC-OPF-M, 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332-0145. Our FAX number is AUTOVON 221-5668. For microfiche information, the attention line is TAPC-MSR-M.

96D SURVEY

PERSCOM is conducting a survey to collect MOS-level task performance data from imagery analysts (privates through master sergeants) who participated in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Results from this survey will provide the Intelligence Center with lessons learned and will help shape future job classification and training for imagery analysts. If you are in this category and haven't received your survey booklet, please contact PERSCOM, ATTN: TAPC-PIM-OTB (Lynn Gramzow), 200 Stovall St., Alexandria, VA 22332, or call AUTOVON 221-3225 or Commercial 703-325-3225.

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TOTAL FORCE



Regulation Update

A recent update to **AR 600-9, The Army Weight Control Program**, states overweight soldiers are not permitted to attend professional military schooling. The change requires the soldier's height and weight be recorded on his TDY orders or PCS packet. Soldiers who arrive overweight will be dropped from the course. All soldiers must be able to pass a PT test and meet height and weight standards before attending Army schools. The bottom line is don't send a soldier to an Army school if he's overweight.

Video Teletraining

Video Teletraining (VTT) is a state-of-the-art communications net, providing 2-way video and audio communications. It's operational 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. VTT integrates interactive video, audio, graphics, and computer-based teletraining technologies. It delivers individual, collective, and battle staff training to the Total Force. Users can distribute live instruction, computer-based instruction, videotape, and paper-based products over the VTT system.

Congressional appropriation has allowed the National Guard Bureau to install VTT systems at 41 sites throughout CONUS. The VTT system currently links the Defense Language School, Fort Huachuca, and Fort Lewis. Students at Fort Huachuca or Fort Lewis can attend DLI-conducted training without leaving their home stations. VTT offers MOS sustainment training, including initial, remedial, sustainment, enrichment, and enhancement training; cross-training; instructor training; and foreign language proficiency evaluation. Soon,

a soldier in Washington will be able to interrogate a soldier in Florida with the instructor monitoring the interrogation from Fort Huachuca—and they will do it all in foreign languages.

Course Update: CAS³ Impact for Non-MI Soldiers

RC officers who have not attended the MIOBC and are in line for a 35D slot can now enroll in the newly configured RC-MIOTC. The new RC-MIOTC has two phases. Phase I has 16 subcourses and you can apply for this phase right now. Phase II is a 2-week resident phase to be taught at ITAAS-Huachuca in the summer of '93. The RC-MIOTC is also a must if you need to branch transfer into MI and can attend the shortened RC-MIOAC.

The new two-phased RC-MIOAC is on track for the summer '94 at ITAAS-Huachuca. Enrollment for Phase I, Correspondence, begins 2d quarter FY 93, with the 2-week resident phase slated for summer '94 at Fort Huachuca.

The current RC-MIOAC has two resident phases of 2 weeks each and one correspondence phase. The current RC-MIOAC will be given through summer '94. So those of you currently enrolled need to finish. Note that as of October 1991, the Army correspondence phase satisfies your CAS³ correspondence requirement. As you are aware, MI, like all TRADOC Proponents, had to eliminate a 2-week resident phase from its OAC to make room for CAS³. The action officer with all the answers for you is Major Mel Kloor. You may write him at Commander, USAIC, ATTN: ATSI-TDI-R, or call him at DSN 821-2085.

TRAINING NOTES



By Colonel John H. Black and
Major Kenneth A. Watras

Imagine yourself as a corps collection manager in the not-too-distant future. You and your staff work in a high-tech corps tactical operations support element. You're surrounded by state-of-the-art computerized intelligence workstations, tactical exploitation of national capabilities (TENCAP) systems interfaces, and communications downlinks from multiple intelligence sensors. **You** manage all of these systems, interfaces, and sensors. **You** ensure the G2, corps commander, and subordinate commanders receive the intelligence they need promptly. **You**, in effect, orchestrate the intelligence system for the entire command.

Does this sound farfetched? Well, it may now, but we're rapidly moving in that direction. To train soldiers on future battlefield operations doctrine and emerging systems, the Intelligence Center is developing a new long-range training strategy. Since the new strategy places collection management at the forefront, the Intelligence Center has revised and improved the Collection Management (CM)/TENCAP Course.

ILLUSTRATION: PFC JEFF PREUNINGER

Collection Management/TENCAP 2000: The Revised CM/TENCAP Course

A New Force Structure

The evolving force structure calls for a smaller Army, mainly a CONUS-based force. The Army of the future must be able to deter potential regional threats and conflicts globally, instead of focusing primarily on European-based threats. This mission includes deterrence not only of mid- and high-intensity conflict, but also low-intensity conflict. The evolving threats include—

- ☐ Nuclear and conventional forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States.
- ☐ Multiple regional threats from state and non-state powers in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
- ☐ International drug trafficking.
- ☐ International terrorism.

Lessons learned from Operation DESERT STORM and other combat operations confirm the need for synchronized collection, processing, and dissemination of near-real-time, tailored intelligence. To do this, we need highly-trained intelligence personnel who can orchestrate multiechelon collection management and dissemination operations. We need people who can operate and coordinate multiple intelligence processors, downlinks, and communications systems.

New Technologies

A technological revolution in microcomputers and communications systems presents both challenges and opportunities for MI. During the next decade, DOD will field many new systems—computers, interfaces, and communications systems. As a result, MI will significantly upgrade its intelligence collection, processing, and dissemination capabilities. DOD will continue to develop systems such as the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), Advanced QUICKFIX, GUARDRAIL Common Sen-

sor, and the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS), and link these systems to the Army Tactical Command and Control System.

DOD will also develop and deploy a family of TENCAP systems which support tactical commanders with tailored, near-real-time intelligence. These systems include the Imagery Processing and Dissemination System, Electronic Processing and Dissemination System, Enhanced Tactical Users Terminal, Tactical High Mobility Terminal, and Mobile Imagery Transmission Terminal.

Moreover, the Army will field several computer systems that will significantly increase its analytical capability. These include the Maneuver Control System, FORSCOM Automated Intelligence Support System, and All-Source Analysis System. These systems will have software to support—

- ☐ Automated collection management operations.
- ☐ Telecommunications downlinks for the dissemination of real-time intelligence to the tactical commander.
- ☐ Reliable communications connectivity for tactical MI units to corps, theater, and national agency commanders, staffs, and collection managers.

A New Course of Training

The new, revised CM/TENCAP Course is the result of the new training strategy and the revolution in technology. The Intelligence Center designed the new CM/TENCAP Course to emphasize performance-oriented, hands-on training of critical collection management tasks in concert with emerging doctrine and battlefield operating systems in the coming decades.

In the revised CM/TENCAP Course, students learn how to work as collection managers in the battalion through army component commands. Students include military personnel from staff sergeants to lieutenant colonels and DA civilians. Graduates receive a TENCAP additional skill identifier. The Intelligence Center offers the 3-week course five times a year. Future courses may be longer, however, to incorporate additional training on new systems.

The new course stresses collection management operations at corps, since this level interfaces with tactical, theater, and national intelligence agencies. It emphasizes critical operational tasks in the major collection management areas—requirements, mission, and asset management.

However, the new course goes beyond the previous USAIC collection management overview. It

trains collection management planning for the four stages of military operations: Detection and preparation, establishing conditions for decisive operations, decisive operations, and force reconstitution. It also trains students to prepare statements of intelligence interest, collection plans, collection emphasis messages, and national level messages, such as IMINT 1684, SIGINT amplification, and time sensitive HUMINT collection request.

The course reflects lessons learned from recent combat operations. It augments doctrinal methodology with new planning techniques. These include the intelligence and electronic warfare synchronization plan, as well as collection management for deep operations, dynamic tasking, targeting, and battle damage assessment.

Additionally, the course culminates in a comprehensive, small-group, practical exercise which simulates corps-level collection management and dissemination section operations. Teams receive, plan, and prepare statements of intelligence interest, specific information requirements, and specific orders and requests to support corps contingency missions.

Future CM/TENCAP course initiatives include—

- ☐ A quantum increase in practical exercise hours.
- ☐ A reduction in lecture and conference hours.
- ☐ The development of several fully-automated, practical exercises which replicate corps collection management operations in various theaters of military operations.

Conclusion

Today, and in the future, the collection manager is the pivotal position in our G2 sections. To develop effective, multidiscipline collection managers, the Intelligence Center provides enhanced, realistic training grounded in current and evolving IEW and operations doctrine. We must train our soldiers in multiechelon collection management operations in order to meet future challenges and threats throughout the operational continuum.

Colonel John H. Black serves as the USAIC Chief of Staff. During the Gulf War, he served on the 3d Army G2 staff. He has a bachelor's degree in history from Fort Lewis College and a master's degree from Idaho State University. Colonel Black is a graduate of the Infantry Officer Candidate School, Post Graduate Intelligence Program, EW-Crypto Tactical Operations Course, the Command and General Staff College, and the Naval War College.

Major Kenneth A. Watras is Chief of the Training Branch, Intelligence Division, Department of Tactics, Intelligence, and Military Science. Major Watras served as collection manager at both the U.S. European Command and VII Corps. He is a graduate of Ohio State University and is working on a master's degree at Boston University.

VANTAGE POINT *(Continued from page 2)*

- ☐ J-STARS and its Ground Station Module.
- ☐ UAV-Close.
- ☐ Advanced QUICKFIX (AQF).
- ☐ Ground-Based Common Sensor (GBCS).
- ☐ ASAS (with Hawkeye in the TCAE enclave).
- ☐ The Tactical High Mobility Terminal (THMT) (five already fielded).
- ☐ The Modular Integrated Tactical Terminal (MITT), a downsized follow-on to the THMT.
- ☐ Trackwolf.

The advantages these systems provide over the current suite of systems include:

- ☐ State-of-the-art technology and the ability to exploit any known threat.
- ☐ Balance between disciplines, instead of the significant overreliance on signals intelligence in our present systems.
- ☐ Targeting accuracies to the depths of the battlefield inherent in virtually every collection system mentioned, compared to none in our current family of systems.
- ☐ Real-time or near-real-time downlinks to multiple battlefield nodes with each recipient able to tailor the data received by geography, time, or event to support that particular echelon and function.
- ☐ Where appropriate, direct collector to shooter links.

As I said earlier, these systems will revolutionize the support we will be able to provide to commanders. Specifically, we will be able to provide them a dynamic, focused view of the battlefield and enemy situation tailored to echelon and function. This battlefield view will be a visual, status-at-a-glance type depiction, including a combination of Moving Target Indicator (MTI) radar, live UAV video, digital imagery, and dynamic graphic updates versus narrative reports. We will also be able to provide commanders near-real-time targeting to the depths of the battlefield with optimal quickfire channels to FSEs and attack elements.

With the wide range of capabilities of our new systems we will also be able to satisfy multiple priorities and functions, often concurrently, including wide area surveillance/situation development, targeting and target development, BDA, and even battle management. However, with this comes a concomitant requirement for combined arms commanders to specify their priorities dynamically and, when required, to prioritize between functions they want supported; for example, targeting or BDA or

battle management. In essence, the commander must dynamically focus his IEW battlefield operating system (BOS) and synchronize it with his other BOSs, just as he focuses and synchronizes maneuver and fire support. Our responsibility, then, will be to provide him the tailored intelligence products and targets he wants, when he wants them, synchronized with his concept of the operation.

Our revolution has not been created in a vacuum. It has been designed with the help of virtually every element of our MI Corps. Every command has participated in the development of the AIMP and in the work of the MI Relook Task Force. Combat commanders at several echelons also contributed to both the Relook effort and the design of our DOTML changes. As mentioned, INSCOM has been a full partner in this effort and has a full-time detachment assigned at Fort Huachuca.

Finally, we have worked with pertinent TRADOC proponents to ensure we have addressed their requirements, including establishing a Joint Targeting Task Group with the Field Artillery, Aviation, and Air Defense Centers to ensure we understand the time lines and accuracy requirements we must satisfy in providing them targets and threats.

In summarizing the essence of our impending MI revolution, I want to emphasize six points:

- ☐ Our revolution is by design.
- ☐ It has been coordinated throughout the Army, not only in the MI community.
- ☐ We can bring it in and field all new systems and still accommodate directed cuts in our force structure.
- ☐ We understand and are already well down the road in addressing the DOTML implications of our revolution.
- ☐ We have also established the procedures and organizational constructs to perpetuate and build on our revolution to ensure we always stay with technology and ahead of any potential threats.
- ☐ The entire Army is the beneficiary of our revolution, because it will enable us to support commanders properly on any battlefield to ensure they can win decisively and quickly.

As mentioned earlier, a critical ingredient in the success of our revolution will be the establishment of a seamless system of intelligence systems from the FLOT through national agencies. Army EAC is critical to this effort, and this edition of the MIPB describes some of the developments in INSCOM and EAC intelligence organizations and operations which will lead to that end. I encourage you to read them and to learn how a critical element of our MI Corps is operating and evolving.

VANTAGE POINT

(Continued from page 3)

Authority notifies the PERSCOM commander of the decision to drop the NCO from the course and to remove him from the ANCOC selection list. Also, the school commandant sends a letter to the

soldier's gaining command informing them of his overweight status.

You can expect ANCOC and BNCOC at the Intelligence Center to apply the standards to the letter. The standards are clear and the consequences are severe. Be certain you are within proper weight standards set by **AR 600-9, The Army Weight Control Program**, Interim Change Number 101, dated November 15, 1991.

LETTERS

(Continued from page 5)

regime has changed in the communist world does not mean their intelligence services are not operating. On the contrary, unstable times demand we gather intelligence information on an even grander scale.

Why, then, should the masters of budget continue to feed us less each day? There will come a time when someone will point a fat finger at the skeletal remains of CI and demand to know why commanders were not kept informed; or worse, why our intentions and capabilities were so well known by the enemy.

Now more than ever, our nation's future security depends on a forward looking, proactive CI corps that will ensure our commanders have the necessary information to go forth and conquer.

William F. Johnson
Munich, Germany

Dear Editor:
Captain Eldridge's article, "Delusions of Grandeur" Ethnocentrism and

Wehrmacht Intelligence Analysis" in January-March **MIPB**, is very interesting. However, there are several significant points that, while not directly addressing German racial bias, are important. First, the German Army used the **ENIGMA** Coding Machine to transmit operational orders to Army commands in the field. A copy of this machine was in the hands of the Allies since the early days of World War II, and the SIGINT "take" was known as **ULTRA**. In other words, the Allies knew *beforehand* most of the German military intentions and capabilities.

Second, after December 1941, the Germans and their allies were fighting a **two-front war** which led to Germany's defeat in World War I, and also led to its defeat in World War II. Third, the German campaign against the Red Army, called Operation Barbarossa, was not supposed to last years but only months. Fourth, I don't believe the majority of German military officers or their intelligence personnel can be categorized as ethnocentric. If anything, senior

German officers often were in the forefront to remove Hitler and his leading SS and Nazi Party members. Arrogance is not necessarily racial bias, it is conceit.

Fifth, the Germans successfully created the **Vlasov Russian Army of Liberation** which numbered in the hundreds of thousands. In fact, the Germans were able to create national ethnic formations from just about every republic in the Soviet Union. They were never used to their maximum potential but they were significant. We have not found a solution to ethnocentric bias and its ramifications. Almost all people have this problem to some extent. However, the bottom line is that no matter how good or bad the German intelligence service or their ethnocentric bias and notions of being "supermen" were, Germany's military defeat was inevitable for a variety of other reasons as well.

M.S. Evancevich
Fort Huachuca, AZ

Soldier's HOTLINE

Army relies heavily on field input in its efforts to modernize doctrine, equipment, and support for the soldier.

The hotline gives soldiers and commanders a voice in deciding what a soldier wears, carries, or consumes in a tactical environment. Call 1-800-SOLDIER to give us your recommendations to improve battlefield capabilities of lethality, command and control, survivability, sustainment, and mobility.

The Training and Doctrine Command Soldier Systems Manager, located at Fort Benning, Georgia, has established a soldier hotline. The 24-hour hotline was established because the

PROFESSIONAL READING

The Rise of Nations in the Soviet Union: American Foreign Policy and the Disintegration of the USSR, ed. Michael Mandelbaum (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1991) 115 pages, \$14.95.

As the Soviet Union breaks apart, the U.S. must determine how to deal with the nations emerging from what was once the Soviet Empire. The Soviet state is now extinct. It was the last of a political species—the multinational empire—that once dominated the world. Gorbachev's reforms fatally damaged the pillars on which the USSR once rested: Ideology and dictatorship. Marxism-Leninism as an ideology is now discredited, and the second pillar was swept aside in August 1991.

In the Soviet Union, the process of decolonization will prove difficult and bloody. The situation closely resembles the vanished empires of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Turks, and may suffer the same fate. With over 100 distinct officially recognized groups, the problems are enormous. The greatest threat comes from the Soviet Central Asian Islamic Republics—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kirghizia—whose loyalties seem to be cultural and religious rather than national. As the Baltics gain their independence and the western republics of Ukraine and Byelorussia try to exert their own independence, the U.S. and the West face difficult choices: Which claims of independence to support, and how to keep the violence from escalating into a full-fledged civil war, or spilling over into other countries.


The book's various essays address the problems of nationalism, starting with the Sarajevo syndrome, which attempts to describe how a small event can flare up into a full-scale civil war. Problems of immediate U.S. concern

are nuclear proliferation, control of nuclear weapons, and, should more than one nuclear power emerge, how to deal with them.

Although the authors wrote about policy options before the August coup, the conflicts and possible outcomes they discuss are still valid. The book is valuable in that it offers a clear and concise overview of policy options the U.S. might pursue. It's interesting to note that one of the options is to do nothing, under the current circumstances.

Captain Gilles Van Nederveen,
USAF
Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C.

The Soviet Union After Perestroika: Change and Continuity by Paul Holman, et al (Cambridge: Brassey's, Inc., 1991), 117 pages, \$9.95.



This book's subject is easily the most vital topic of the day. Six tightly written essays examine key national security dimensions in the Soviet Union. They all conclude, in different ways, that Perestroika is not going the way its architects intended.

In "Whither Perestroika? Possible Outcomes of Soviet Reform," Professor Paul Holman of the Naval War College writes that economic and political restructuring, while bravely conceived, is a long descent into chaos. He predicts armed resistance by disgruntled power figures. Professors Paul Craig Roberts and Karen LaFollette of the Institute for Political Economy examine historical Russian views on money and production. They predict chronic instability until the Russian people fully accept the concept of private property. This, they say, may take many years.

Senior Soviet Analyst John J. Dziak of the Secretary of Defense office offers a scathing performance history of the KGB, the GRU, and the MVD. His chapter, "Finding a Place: The Future of the Soviet Security Services," shows that Soviet intelligence and security forces are more active now than ever before. Significantly, many Western news media and political figures think Perestroika ushered in an era of re-trenched activity among the Soviet security services.

Andrew F. Krepinevich and Fred F. Littlepage serve with the Director of New Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Their "Winds of Change: The Decline of Soviet Power and Its Implications for Western

Security" concludes the decline of Soviet military power mandates a different but still very significant military security role for the U.S. and Europe.

Sergey Fedorenko was with the Division of Conceptual Problems of U.S. National Security, Institute for the U.S. and Canada, USSR Academy of Sciences. He now serves as a Research Fellow at the U.S. Naval War College. In "Roots and Origins of the Protracted Soviet Crisis," he shows how Mikhail Gorbachev outran his power base and defeated his own goals. This created a climate conducive to counterattack by Communist Party and security forces.

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., is President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis at Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Pfaltzgraff sketches out a role for future U.S. national security that includes a presence in regional conflict resolution. This role takes into account the USSR's enormous military capabilities and strategic resources.

The book has an executive summary in the front with no author given. Unfortunately, it has no index, no bibliography, and no editorial summary beyond the executive summary. Also, it could have been edited better. And, since some of the events are outdated, what value could this slim volume have now?

First, these eight authors are factual and convincing and come close to predicting the August 1991 attempt to oust Gorbachev. Second, even with the book's cut-and-paste format, it's the best analysis to date of recent national security processes in the Soviet Union, and of the people who control them. Third, the essays do what most national security analyses fail to do: They link economic behavior to political and military processes.

One wishes this little book could be projected into American homes via the popular news media, so valuable is it. The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Cambridge sponsored it, and grants from the Earhart Foundation and the John M. Olin Foundation funded it. It deserved more attention than it got in early 1991 because the processes it describes, the linkages it demonstrates, and the caveats it derives are still valid.

Russell W. Ramsey, Ph.D.
Maxwell Air Force Base, AL

Beyond Glasnost: The Post-Totalitarian Mind by Jeffrey C. Goldfarb (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 240 pages, \$24.95.

Jeffrey Goldfarb writes "Something truly new is emerging in the Soviet Bloc." He attempts to use this book to "illuminate the cultural and political alternatives to modern tyranny" which he sees developing in Eastern Europe. "Post-Totalitarianism," in Goldfarb's usage, is primarily a cultural phenomenon: Rejection of "official" truth and an attempt "to act as if one lived in a free society." The goal of post-totalitarianism is, therefore, not any particular political system, but rather a culture which values the rational and open exchange of differing opinions.

The author provides a good overview of efforts to develop an autonomous, nonofficial cultural life throughout Eastern Europe in the 1980's. However, he's less successful in building his analytical framework or in putting his analysis into a political context. To understand post-totalitarianism, Goldfarb insists we must first understand totalitarianism.

We immediately find ourselves on the slippery slope of definitions, and Goldfarb takes 80 pages to argue that totalitarianism is "best understood as the cultural form necessary for modern tyranny." The social sciences are plagued by writers defining their terms in a unique way designed to support their arguments. In tackling totalitarianism Goldfarb rushes headlong at one of the most controversial terms in political science.

One of the more common approaches places totalitarianism, as an "ideal type," at one end of a scale measuring public participation in the political system. "Pluralism," again as an "ideal type," forms the other extreme. According to this view, systems can be more or less totalitarian, depending on how closely they approach the "ideal" of total control over society. Goldfarb rejects this approach, arguing that such a model "washes out the historical distinctive-

ness of 20th-century totalitarian movements and regimes, and too readily severs their connection with the project of modernity."

Goldfarb dwells on Poland's Solidarity as the prime example of post-totalitarianism trends in Eastern Europe. He finds the genesis of these trends in the Polish protests of 1976, when the formation of the Committee to Defend Workers signaled an unprecedented alliance between the country's intelligentsia and the workers. According to Goldfarb, opposition activists in 1976 recognized that reform could not come from above, and began to carve out spheres of cultural autonomy. "Not until 1980," writes Goldfarb—when the intelligentsia-worker alliance blossomed as Solidarity—"did this strategy of reform become visible to all Poles and, in fact, to the whole world."

Finally, the book is crippled by nearly impenetrable sociological jargon. "We have seen how the post-totalitarians have deconstructed the totalitarian conflation of truth and politics," Goldfarb writes in the Epilogue. "Central elements of totalitarianism were frontally reversed." Earlier he warns us, "the politics of avant garde and anti-avant garde culture and the cultural policy of vanguard politics make up a semiotic whole.... The present day Left and Right in the nontotalitarian modern world do not sufficiently appreciate the importance of guarding against social, political, and cultural dedifferentiation." What might this mean?

Beyond Glasnost is tough going, with its liabilities outweighing its assets. There are more lucid books available about totalitarianism, and much better books about Eastern Europe.

Captain Chris A. Pilecki
Frankfurt, Germany

War, Ends and Means by Paul Seabury and Angelo Codevilla (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1989), 304 pages, \$19.95.

Seabury and Codevilla estimate that since 1900 approximately 35 million people have perished as a conse-

quence of direct military conflict. Of these, 25 million were civilians. During this same century, at least 100 million people died by police action through starvation, execution, or other means. Those responsible for these deaths did not face much resistance; the people were killed during "peacetime." One of the primary causes of war is people's fear of this kind of peace.

Before Judeo-Christian teachings, tribal custom recognized only human and inhuman distinctions. Then war against other tribes became necessary for safety, security of territory, and possession of other human beings. The Judeo-Christian influence has dictated standards for war in the West. Human equality made armed hostility a legitimate variance from a normal state of peace. Human maturity and Christian influence have helped develop governments whose primary purpose became maintenance of peace.

However, the Islamic rationale for war redefines the "all men are created equal" axiom. Muslim tradition defines peace as a proper state only for believers; war is for nonbelievers. The majority of mankind, considering the numbers of Chinese, Indian, and Third World inhabitants, only superficially adopts the Western or Muslim tradition.

War, Ends and Means merits your reading. It presents historical examples and conclusions on why nations fight, what happens when they go to war, how they fight, and what makes peace. The authors advance excellent sociological and historical explanations of what war and peace mean to mankind. They cite examples from the Napoleonic Wars, American Revolutionary and Civil Wars, and the Second World War to expand on Clausewitz's concept of the fog of war. They help clarify those political considerations which a nation must resolve for it to pursue war: Who will fight? Who will lead? What are the strategic objectives? How can they be met? Interestingly, they conclude that the answers change as nations progress through war.


The book deals principally with what is a just war and what is peace. The question of a just war is separated into two parts: Is it right or wrong to

fight or go to war for a particular cause in a particular circumstance? Are the actions taken in the cause of war right or wrong? The concept of peace is more complex. The termination of war does not necessarily lead to the kind of peace in which everyone lives happily ever after.

Seabury and Codevilla believe there's an art to preventing, planning, and fighting war. "The primary requirement of this art is concentration of the mind, not to say single mindedness." They remind us to ask the fundamental questions about peace and war: "What can possibly satisfy the enemy? What means does he have to ensure his satisfaction? How much do we value our kind of peace? What, then, do we have to do to make it possible?"

War, Ends and Means effectively presents a case for continued study and sensitivity to the phenomenon of war.

Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Allenbaugh
Fort Bragg, NC



OSS Against the Reich: The World War II Diaries of Colonel David E.K. Bruce, ed. Nelson D. Lankford (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1991), 257 pages, \$28.50.

It is rare, indeed, that an intelligence officer would keep a personal diary—and even more rare that the diary should be published 50 years later. Through his diaries, Colonel Bruce gives us a rare opportunity to look back 50 years and see how one senior intelligence officer helped organize and manage a wartime intelligence structure.

Colonel Bruce was General Donovan's right hand man in running

the OSS's London office. Although, many of his entries deal only with personality issues and insights, he does give us eyewitness accounts of OSS operations in North Africa and Italy, the D-Day invasion of Normandy, and ultimately the liberation of Paris. What also makes this book unique is that Colonel Bruce knew celebrities such as Averell Harriman, Bill Stephenson, Allen Dulles, Ed Murrow, and Ernest Hemingway, as well as the G2s of almost every Allied corps and army involved in the World War II European Theater. This book shows us the human side of intelligence work, especially from a man who would continue in high-level ambassadorial positions following the war.

I found it to be especially well edited with meticulous footnotes assembled by the book's editor. All in all, a jewel of a book on some of the personal aspects of wartime life by an intelligence officer who helped make the forerunner of the CIA a success. It's worth reading—especially for those who have been stationed in Europe.

Captain Eric K. Naeseth
Annapolis, MD

The Transformation of Western Europe by William Wallace (New York: The Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990), 107 pages, \$14.95.

I highly recommend this book to readers interested in developments in Europe. It's a short, insightful analysis of events in Europe since World War II. It provides the framework for watching European developments for years to come.

The author's premise is that, while the U.S. and the Soviet Union rebuilt Europe after the war, the nations of

Europe began to come together. Beginning with the national unification of Italy and Germany in the mid-19th century, it continued with the attempt to stabilize Eastern Europe after World War I. Today, there exists an international cooperation brought about mainly because European nations no longer compete among themselves for power, as they did during most of the 19th and early 20th centuries.

European integration has been primarily economic. In fact, the American Marshall Plan laid the groundwork for European economic alliances in the late 1940's. With the passing of time, the U.S. turned her eyes away from Europe and toward other parts of the world. European leaders then began to work together as they saw potential economic independence from the U.S. This cooperation led to increased intra-European travel, trade, and military alliances. Recent international political crises in Afghanistan, Iran, and Poland continue to move European governments to establish formal political ties with each other.

Movement toward European unification has been slow, but perceptible. No one knows how far it will go. Significant problems of language, history, and culture still have to be overcome. This book, though, provides a valuable guide to the future of Europe.

Captain Robert McMichael
Fort Huachuca, AZ

The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation: Soviet Breakthrough and Pursuit in the Arctic, October 1944, Leavenworth Paper Number 17, by Major James F. Gebhardt (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, 1989), 182 pages, Free.

Every soldier with duties in the Far North should read this book. It's an account of the Soviet operation that swept the Germans from the approaches to Murmansk and ended with the liberation of northern Norway. This is by far the best, most lucid exposition ever prepared about the one operation from which all modern Soviet Far North warfighting doctrine flows. With the continued buildup of Soviet forces in the Kola Peninsula,

Glasnost notwithstanding, **The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation** is still relevant today and bears close reading.

Author Gebhardt is an armor officer now assigned to the Soviet Army Studies Office. He writes in a clear, crisp style, with something for everyone: Balanced accounts of the roles of combat, combat support, and combat service support arms. He has a particularly fascinating chapter on the role of Soviet Spetsnaz and other special purpose troops in this operation. The book is concise, objective, and accurate.

Gebhardt has gone to great lengths on the latter score, including visiting the Norwegian side of the battlefield and correlating German and Soviet sources for each major and several minor events.

Also remarkable is that Gebhardt, a Russian linguist, made extensive use of Soviet sources. Heretofore, accounts of World War II in the Far North have relied almost exclusively on one-sided German records. **Petsamo-Kirkenes** is also well illustrated, with ample maps and photographs. This well edited book has neither the fluff nor the meandering that often characterizes other works using foreign sources.

The book also has many insights into the operational art Soviets practiced, and Westerners seldom understood. **Petsamo-Kirkenes** is good reading for intelligence and special operations soldiers, military buffs, and anyone interested in the Soviet Union's history and capabilities in the Far North.

Major William H. Burgess III
Fort Bragg, NC

Inside Stalin's Gulag by Kazimierz Zarod (New York: The State Mutual Book, 1990), 275 pages, \$14.95.

Dr. Norman Stone, a Sovietologist at Oxford University, observed that man is the most difficult of all animals to kill. Most difficult, he said, because man must be killed in both body and spirit. The carnage inflicted with such indifference on man by men during and under the cover of wars may cause one to pause before accepting

that assertion. In our own lifetime, millions have died at the hands of a few thousand, on orders from a handful. Yet out of that carnage, in spite of tremendous deprivation and against tremendous odds, some survived. "Kaz" Zarod was one who survived. **Inside Stalin's Gulag** is this man's story, masterfully presented with a disarming absence of rancor or bitterness.

Kaz Zarod's life was not normal even before Germany swept into Poland in September of 1939. As a boy, he spent several years in Siberia where his father served a "lenient" 10-year sentence for subversive activities against the Czar. After he and his family returned to Poland, he finished university studies, served 2 years as an officer in the air force, and was comfortably starting a career in Warsaw civil service. However, Hitler's invasion of Poland changed all that in just a few days.

Ordered to relocate to Romania where a government in exile would be established, Kaz fled unsuspectingly into the arms of the invading Soviet Army as it rushed to "help" the Poles.

He was captured, released, and finally arrested again. Offered a choice between being handed back to the Germans as slave labor or adopting Soviet citizenship and induction into the Soviet Army, Kaz selected neither. His "uncooperative attitude" subjected him to increased levels of interrogation and eventually to internment in the Gulag.

Kaz's fluency in Russian, acquired during his boyhood in Siberia, proved to be a blessing, and a crushing burden, sometimes both at the same time. He soon recognized that he had to hide his linguistic ability from his captors. They reasoned that only a spy would be able to speak Russian, especially Russian with a Siberian accent. During interrogation, his carefully concealed knowledge of the language allowed him to know what his guards and interrogators said to each other—information that frequently he really didn't want to know. Later, his fluency in Russian contributed to his survival and afforded him, and now his readers, an entirely different glimpse of the Russian people.

Kaz's description of Soviet interrogation techniques—the predictable and the bizarre—could serve as a primer for resistance-to-interrogation training. His description of the brutality and hardships experienced during his journey to and internment in Siberia should be required reading for anyone taking survival training.

Kaz's vivid portrayal of life in the camps reveals the utter helplessness of the inmates. The camps were places where a simple human kindness could and did extend life in some instances, and bring death in others. Intelligence, cleverness, and determination contributed to Kaz's survival, aided by the human capacity to endure. But the final discriminator was "chance." Despite his fight for life, Kaz reached a point where his body was ready to die. Chance intervened and enabled him not only to recover but eventually to enjoy the subsequent transformation from being an enemy of the people to being regarded as an "almost trusted" ally.

Kaz Zarod survived and made his way to the West returning to the war zone as a member of the free Polish Air Force. In 1981, culminating a long professional career, he retired as a senior lecturer in Slavonic language from the British School of Service Intelligence.

Inside Stalin's Gulag is very timely as we watch the Soviet leopard change its spots again. And we of the West, again, become an "almost trusted" ally.

Colonel (Retired) Stanley T. Winarski
Hampton, VA

Thunder In The Desert: The Strategy and Tactics of the Persian Gulf War by James Blackwell (New York: Bantam Books, 1991), 238 pages, \$12.95.

The author is a retired Army major. Billed as the "first comprehensive in-depth history" of military operations in the Gulf War, this work gives the reader a close look at the big picture. The introduction is a good overview of the history of this region. Quotes from many of the key players help show the

allied forces' emotion and resolve. Many showed a sense of history as they launched their part of the liberation of Kuwait.

The author discusses tactics—where Iraq's concept of tactics came from. He points to Iraq's failures and successes in its conflict with Iran, and shows how most nations plan for war based on their last experience. Iraq clearly failed to comprehend the strategy and tactics of the allied coalition. It also did not understand that the strategy of attrition doesn't work against an opponent that subscribes to annihilation.

As Iraq surged into Kuwait, their military strength was impressive. The question unanswered is why, with all that manpower and equipment, didn't Iraq continue into Saudi Arabia? Our estimate of their ability to maneuver their forces, based on Iraq's war with Iran, caused considerable allied concern. American options would have been far more limited had Iraq continued south.

The author compares weapon systems, uses charts and graphs, and provides pictures that help tell the story. This book touches all the issues from the courtrooms in America to the hotels in Baghdad. The questions raised should serve the reader in future discussion on the issues affecting U.S. military services. For example, what role should we play in future regional conflicts, and what if we don't

have UN support and the clear moral high ground? The author goes on to make recommendations that deserve consideration.

Thunder In the Desert is easy to read and should be a starting point in reading the history and after-action reports of the Persian Gulf War.

First Lieutenant Harold R. Sanborn
Fort Huachuca, AZ


Night Stalkers: Twilight Justice by Duncan Long (New York: Harper Paperbacks, 1990) 262 pages, \$3.95.

If you're looking for an entertaining read and you've exhausted Ian Fleming, pick up **Twilight Justice**. Like James Bond, Captain Jefferson Davis "Oz" Carson is the kind of hero that comes through a lot of action unscathed.

The story begins at a Paris air show where the U.S. unveils a super stealth jet. The craft is stolen and the rest of the book is a chase scene of sorts. I won't tell you the ending—you'll have to discover it yourself!

There's plenty of nomenclature and a few descriptive paragraphs that could have come from **Jane's Defense Weekly**. If this kind of thing turns you on, **Night Stalkers** is the book for you.

Captain Celia Webb
Fort Huachuca, AZ



260th

Military Intelligence Battalion (Linguist)



The unit crest consists of an oriental blue and silver gray shield, with a silver scroll inscribed "Intellegentia et Veritas." Within the crest, the key symbolizes knowledge, authority, and security. The quill over the dagger underscores that the pen is mightier than the sword. The sphinx heads facing in opposite directions signify constant vigilance. The motto in Latin "Intellegentia et Veritas" means "Intelligence and Truth." Latin is appropriate because the unit's main foreign language focus—Spanish—has its roots in Latin.

Unique within the Total Force, the 260th MI Battalion (Linguist) is part of a new initiative to conserve perishable linguist and intelligence skills. Under the auspices of the 300th MI Brigade, Utah Army National Guard, who defined the concept, six Reserve Component linguist units were formed throughout CONUS. The 260th MI Battalion (Linguist) was created in the Florida Army National Guard in October 1988 as both an intelligence unit and a linguist unit. An important milestone was its Federal recognition at Miami on December 1, 1990.

The battalion headquarters, headquarters company, and B Company are located in Miami, while A Company is located 60 miles to the south at Homestead, Florida. The location of the new SIGINT/EW company, C Company, is also expected to be in the southeastern Florida area. The first two lettered companies, A and B, contain HUMINT assets in the form of CI and interrogator platoons and teams of language qualified personnel. C Company will be SIGINT/EW in the 98G/98C arena. The 260th is not meant to be a maneuver unit at the battalion or company level. Instead, CI, interrogator, and EW teams and platoons will deploy to in-place intelligence organizations and units needing linguistic support.

The Miami area has many citizen-soldiers with excellent language skills, cultural awareness, and extensive appreciation of events within this hemisphere. Although Latin American Spanish is the battalion's main target language, many members are multilingual. Eleven languages are represented in the unit as well as obscure dialects within Spanish.

Because of the unique way it brings intelligence and language expertise together, the 260th has a big role in the FLARNG Counter-Drug Program. In addition to field support of Federal agencies, many 260th soldiers work in intelligence support positions directly at the Federal agency intelligence staff level. These postings have given the 260th a cadre of individuals with intelligence experience not usually seen in Reserve Component units.

Although very new in terms of recent activation, the 260th MI Battalion (Linguist) has already sent detachments, teams, and individual linguists to a variety of missions worldwide. Our people have gained a wide range of experience through their support of U.S. Army South, troop and exercise deployments, and requests from allied foreign military exercises. The 260th MI Battalion (Linguist) stands ready to support the Total Force.

Commander
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